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1 Introduction
The many faces of Korean innovation
Rarely has so much hope been invested in a single scientist. Woo-Suk Hwang 
symbolised South Korea’s ambitions to become a scientific power, and enjoyed 
a string of breakthroughs in 2005 which seemed to confirm his success. In the spring 
of that year, Science published his paper announcing the creation of patient-specific 
stem cell lines,1 a world first. In October, he opened the Seoul World Stem Cell 
Bank to international fanfare. When he spoke at the BioMedi Symposium in Seoul 
the following day, bolstered by a who’s who of international stem cell research, 
he was cheered as a celebrity. Hwang’s speech dwelled on the desperately ill 
patients who had found hope in the promise of his treatments, while also appealing 
to Korean nationalism. ‘I put the Korean flag in the middle of western science,’2 
said Hwang, evoking the image of Neil Armstrong planting the US flag on the moon.
  Some estimate that more than $60 million of public money was 
invested in his work. Everything he did was designed for optimal 
media coverage, from a failed attempt to clone a tiger to a 
cloned dog, Snuppy.3 In June 2005 the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST) elevated Hwang to become Korea’s first
  ‘Supreme Scientist’.
  In little more than a decade, Korea, a country the size of the 
US state of Indiana with no internationally known pharmaceutical 
companies and little biotech capability, had catapulted itself to 
leadership in one of bioscience’s most promising fields. Hwang’s 
success sent out a wider message: Asian science could leapfrog 
the West faster than anyone had dared predict. His advances 
were the basis for research elsewhere in the world. Researchers 
in Europe and the US used Hwang’s success to argue for more 
funding to keep pace.
But all too quickly Hwang’s success story unravelled. Suspicions were raised over 
whether Hwang encouraged female researchers to provide eggs for experiments. 
Worse, Hwang was then accused of faking his results. An inquiry by Seoul National 
University (SNU), his university, found that the experiments could not be replicated. 
By late 2005, Korea’s superstar scientist was on trial as his personal ‘stem cell 
bubble’ burst spectacularly, prompting a mix of bewilderment and denial across 
Korea. People were slow to accept that Hwang could be a fraud. In March 2006, 
weeks after the SNU Investigation Committee had confirmed the fraud, 4000 
people in Seoul marched in support of the fallen celebrity.
In the wake of ‘Hwanggate’ it might be tempting to write off Korea as a science 
power. The idea that a still-developing Asian nation could leapfrog western science 
seems to have proven far-fetched. Even a superstar scientist couldn’t compensate 
for the structural weaknesses of the system, in which less than 10 per cent of 
pharmaceutical companies conduct R&D.4
But just as too much was invested in Hwang it would be a mistake to write off 
Korea’s potential to become a significant source of science-driven innovation. 
Korea has achieved miracles in the past 40 years, and it might do the same again.
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07 Introduction
 Table 1 Phases of Korea’s growth and major policies
Korea’s industrialisation miracle
South Korea emerged from Japanese occupation and a civil war that killed more 
than one million people, with gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of US$80 
in 1960. By 2005, it had become the world’s tenth largest economy, with GDP per 
capita of over $15,000.5 It achieved this thanks to US support and a combination 
of hard work and brainpower. South Korea had little else to rely on: partition gave 
75 per cent of Korean energy resources to the north.
In the ‘imitation phase’ of Korean development in the 1960s and 1970s, state-
directed industrial policy kicked off Korea’s growth.6 Korean firms were contracted 
as suppliers to US and Japanese companies. Gradually, these firms internalised 
and redeveloped technologies from the West to become competitors in their 
own right. The government facilitated investment in R&D by sharing risk through 
government research institutes that helped companies to develop key technologies. 
Korean scientists who returned from the US were enlisted in national projects. 
The ‘internalisation phase’ of the early 1980s took a slowdown in the world 
economy, combined with rising costs, as the prompt for further investment in 
R&D. Private sector R&D investment increased from 0.21 per cent to 1.17 per cent. 
Companies such as Samsung started making branded goods in their own right.
Korean analysts have dubbed the 1990s the ‘innovation phase’,7 with Korean 
companies less dependent on foreign designs and intellectual property and more 
able to explore emerging technologies, for example in mobile communications, on 
equal footing with US and European competitors. In 1998, the Korean government 
set out to turn the country into a knowledge economy, committing to doubling 
investment in R&D and increasing the R&D labour force from 180,000 to 250,000 
by 2007 (see table 1).8
In short, a country that was on its knees at the start of the 1960s, with few natural 
resources, a limited higher education system and little or no research, has succeeded 
through a mixture of brainpower, hard work, state direction of large companies and 
US support, to become one of the most technologically adept and best-educated 
societies in the world.
R&D spending was almost 3 per cent of GDP in 2005,9 about 75 per cent of it 
from private industry. Public funding for R&D in 2006 was US$8.65 billion, a 15 per 
cent increase over 2005. Korea is ranked 15th in the world in terms of scientific 
publications. Between 2000 and 2004, Thomson Scientific indexed 81,057 papers 
with at least one author in South Korea.10 Korea has the highest annual growth in 
patent families – more than 20 per cent11 – and the highest growth in US patents 
from 1986 to 2003. More than 50 per cent of the workforce has a degree, but wage 
levels are about 50 per cent of those in the UK. In many areas, Korean infrastructure 
for science and its technological capability is world class.
Future plans
Korea also deserves to be taken seriously because it has ambitious plans. 
The future, not the past, is where Korea’s science and technology (S&T) begins. 
Nearly every government department, university, research institute or company 
has a vision for the future.
These visions can sometimes appear to be no more than slogans. Korea is used to 
setting itself ambitious targets without being clear how to reach them. But if Korea 
delivers only a share of what it has set out to achieve, it will still be a significant 
force in science and technology.
08 Introduction
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Ten next-generation growth engines were identified in 2003, designed to drive 
Korea’s ‘second leap’ to GDP of US$20,000 per capita by 2012. The Ministry 
of Information and Communications (MIC) ‘Ubiquitous Korea’ or ‘U-Korea’ IT839 
Strategy is designed to help Korea realise a digital welfare state, at a cost to 
government and private industry of US$70 billion by 2010. The Korea IT Industry 
Promotion Agency (KIPA) is promoting open source to turn Korea into an 
international software ‘powerhouse’ with 40 per cent of servers running open 
source operating systems by 2010. The Korea Bio-Vision 2010 aims to push 
South Korea’s biotech ranking from 13th in the world in 2003 to seventh by 2010.12 
Hwang’s disgrace has galvanised a renewed effort involving ten ministries to put 
Korea in the top three counties in biotech by 2015.13 Government plans are for 
Korea to have ten cutting-edge nanotechnologies and 12,600 nanotechnology 
experts by 2010.14
Hwang’s spectacular failure should not mislead us. Korea has the resources and 
intention to be a bigger player in S&T innovation. It will also be followed closely as 
a model by many regions in China.
However, there is still widespread uncertainty about Korea’s capacity to deliver 
on these brave visions and make the transition from state-driven industrial 
development to ubiquitous knowledge economy. Will the techniques that have 
got Korea so far now become obstacles?
The evolving Korean model
Korea’s evolving innovation system is the product of three linked approaches 
that sometimes work together but often seem at odds with one another.
The first is industrial techno-nationalism. The state development model, working 
with large conglomerates (the chaebol) as the main vehicle, remains a powerful 
top-down model of development. One of the biggest questions for Korea is how 
far reform of the ‘state-managed, big company’ economy will go. One force for the 
future, particularly in the wake of the economic crisis of 1997, could be reformed, 
outward-looking and innovative large companies such as Samsung. Yet critics 
argue that in the last few years, efforts to create a more transparent and competitive 
economy have slowed. Few other Korean chaebol seem ready to match Samsung’s 
capacity for innovation and internationalisation.
The second is scientific techno-nationalism. In the last decade, the techno-nationalist 
model has been extended to encompass world-class science. This approach 
emphasises a new generation of scientists and high-tech entrepreneurs as the key 
figures in this story. Funding for science has expanded dramatically and is set to 
continue rising. But so are the expectations and pressures on scientists to deliver 
results. As a result, pressure for reform to Korea’s research and university system 
is likely to mount. More investment in science as the basis for future development 
will also expose Korea to greater international collaboration and scrutiny. It remains 
to be seen what kind of science will emerge from this investment. Government is 
increasing the share of R&D funding put towards basic research to match efforts 
in more developed economies.15 But impatience to get results also puts scientists 
under pressure to deliver results. The Nobel garden at Pohang University of Science 
and Technology (POSTECH) includes empty podiums for future Nobel prize-winning 
Korean scientists. Korea desperately wants recognition for its status as a leading 
source of scientific innovation, but the techno-nationalist model of getting results 
fast may well be at odds with Korea’s ambitions to do world-class science based 
on long-term research.
The third approach is ubiquitous innovation. Korea is one of the most networked, 
connected and well-educated societies in the world. Mobile telephone penetration 
is expected to be over 80 per cent in 2008.16 Phones are beginning to provide not 
just entertainment but health services. Korea’s ubiquitous broadband infrastructure 
can facilitate mass innovation and creativity: CyWorld, for example, is one of 
the world’s top internet networking sites: a combination of blogs, music and chat 
where people pay to decorate and personalise their mini home pages. OhMyNews 
has redefined citizen journalism, providing a multilingual site with millions of readers 
managed by a team of editors a fraction of the size of a traditional newspaper. 
President Roh was swept into office by his huge online fan base. Hwang’s 
collaborators first revealed their concerns about his ethics online. Korea has the 
potential to become a society where aspects of innovation become a mass activity. 
Its demanding and educated consumers may well drive the creation of new markets 
in communications, information and services.
This report argues that it is Korea’s developing capacity for ubiquitous innovation 
that may set it apart in future. There are several distinctive components to this:
—  The state as partner in (not driver of) innovation. Policy-makers argue 
increasingly that government must set the framework for innovation rather 
than direct it.
—  Good education. Korean education excels at the basics, especially maths, but 
also English up to the end of secondary school. This is not matched by the quality 
of higher education, however. University reforms to reduce reliance on rote 
learning and improve teaching and research quality will become more pressing.
—  A technically literate population. Korea’s approach to mobile communication 
is predicated on connected and capable consumers helping to create lead 
markets in new applications for technology. Korea will attempt to follow that 
model in other sectors such as health and biotech.
—  Outstanding infrastructure for distributed innovation. In 2005 Korea ranked 
first among OECD countries in broadband penetration with 25.5 subscribers 
per 100 inhabitants. Fixed line and mobile phone subscriptions were 1302 for 
every 1000 people in 2005.17
—  Chaebol: the modern multinationals. More open, internationalised chaebol such 
as Samsung Electronics could act as role models for the rest of Korean business.
—  Entrepreneurship in emerging areas. New businesses are emerging in areas 
such as biotech and computer games where the chaebol are not dominant. 
Small businesses account for 87 per cent of jobs in Korea and a rising share 
of Korean patents.
—  Dynamic younger generation. There are signs of a fresh wave of Korean 
entrepreneurs in their 30s who have been educated abroad and want to 
work outside the mainstream structures of the state and the chaebol.
—  International collaboration. Koreans are slowly shifting from a developing-
country mindset, which takes technology from abroad and sells it back in low-
cost products, to a more internationalist perspective that seeks collaboration in 
setting standards and creating new markets. A prime example is the development 
of WiBro (portable broadband) being rolled out across the subway system in 
early 2007, a collaborative project between Intel and several Korean firms.
In other ways, Korea still has some way to go if ubiquitous innovation is to be 
realised. Education remains rigid. Small businesses are overshadowed by the 
chaebol. The state’s power to direct and shape industrial development remains 
in the background.
10 Introduction
Ubiquitious innovation is emerging alongside the other Korean models of innovation, 
but is not yet dominant. Under industrial techno-nationalism, the main protagonists 
are the state and the chaebol, backed by a hard-working, largely deferential labour 
force, absorbing knowledge from the West where needed.
Under scientific techno-nationalism, the main players are scientists and 
entrepreneurs supported by the state. Dr Hwang was the most extreme case of 
this reliance on superstar researchers and high-profile programmes to propel Korea 
into the knowledge age.
Under ubiquitous innovation, the main players are internationally connected 
Koreans and entrepreneurs working through networks, in a society that combines 
unprecedented levels of education and connectivity. This mass culture of creativity 
is already making itself felt in mobile communications and computer gaming but 
it could soon migrate into other services such as banking and health care.
It is not difficult to see how these models could work together through a mix 
of state investment in infrastructure, science creating new technologies that 
are transformed into products by large and small companies, educated and 
technologically adept consumers quickly adapting new technologies and allowing 
Korean companies to learn fast about how to apply them.
But these approaches can at times sit in tension. Hwang’s fraud was exposed 
by the younger internet generation, who want the freedom to define their futures, 
and are open to globalisation. On the Biological Research Information Center 
(BRIC) online message boards a thread was started by an anonymous author on 
5 December 2005 entitled ‘the show must go on…’ hinting that some of the pictures 
in one of Hwang’s Science papers were duplicates. Hundreds of posts examining 
the paper followed. That online review forced Hwang to agree to a DNA analysis of 
the stem cell lines. Soon afterwards the paper was withdrawn and SNU started the 
investigation that led to Hwang’s downfall. The more Koreans engage in science, 
the more international exposure will follow, which will be a challenge to the ethos 
of techno-nationalism that has driven Korea forward for almost 50 years.
Korea will become a knowledge-driven, innovation society only by at times being 
painfully at odds with itself, as it learns to navigate the shift from a top-down, 
techno-nationalist approach to one that is more open, cosmopolitan and unplanned.
11 Introduction
A note on methodology
The research for this report was carried out over 18 months by Demos, with the support of an 
expert steering group. The UK part of the project included a number of research seminars, one 
of which focused on Korean science and technology.
Five weeks were spent in Korea doing fieldwork. A focus group and over 70 in-depth interviews 
with policy-makers, scientists and academics were conducted in and around Seoul, Daejeon and 
Pohang. These interviews were supplemented by attending lectures and conferences, and by 
informal discussions with many of the people shaping Korea’s innovation system.
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The magic numbers
Korea sits between China and Japan,
 ‘a shrimp between whales’ with a population 
of 48 million, roughly the same as the number 
of new millionaires in China. Though we cannot 
expect that the eye-catching quantities of 
graduates in China or India will be matched 
anywhere in the world, especially by Korea, 
the numbers do tell a story of sometimes 
surprising and rapid innovation.
This chapter outlines some quantitative measures of innovation in Korea, by 
looking at the inputs and outputs of the country (see table 2). Inputs include human 
resources, expenditure on research and development, and foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Outputs include patents and articles in science and engineering publications.
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Inputs
R&D expenditure in 2005
R&D intensity in 2005 (% of GDP spent on R&D)
Number of industrial R&D centres in 2005
Number of R&D personnel in 2003
Researchers in R&D per 10,000 people
Higher education enrolment rate
Stock of FDI as % of GDP rise between 1998 
and 2004
Broadband DSL internet subscribers 
(out of 104 countries)
Figure
– US$25.03 billion
– 24.15 trillion won
– 2.99%
– 12,104
– 297,060
– 1.8 in 1970
– 16.4 in 1990
– 31.6 in 2003
– 33.2% in 1990
– 81.3% in 2004
– 2–9%
–  16th most preferred 
destination for FDI
– 1st
Source
MOST (2006)
MOST (2006)
KOITA18
MOST (2005)
MOST (2005)
KEDI (2005)19
OECD (2005), 
WDI S&T indica-
tors (2005)20
WEF 200521
Table 2 Mapping Korea’s innovation system
Outputs
Patent applications filed (residents)
Patent applications filed (non-residents)
Patent commercialisation ratio
Transfer ratio of public research to 
private sector
Peer-reviewed publications indexed 
between 2000 and 2004
Global 11-year ranking in peer-reviewed 
publications (1995–2005)
Figure
– 76,860
– 126,836
– 26.7%
– 15.3%
– 81,057
– 15th
Source
WDI (2005)
WDI (2005)
NCST (2005)22
NCST (2005)
Thompson ISI 
(2005)
Thompson ISI 
(2005)
Inputs
Korean R&D was worth just 0.39 per cent of GDP in 1970, but since 2000, R&D 
investment has grown from 2 per cent to 3 per cent of GDP. Expansion of R&D will 
remain a focus for the government as Korea continues to feel the pressures from 
cheaper manufacturing in China and high-end technology in Japan. Korea has 
moved from imitation of mature technologies to a more fluid phase of development, 
but needs investment to stay ahead.
Korea has fallen short of its most ambitious plans in 198927 to increase R&D 
investment to 5 per cent of GDP by 2000. Nevertheless Korea still has the sixth 
highest rate of R&D investment in the world.28 A 2006 MOST report showed that 
South Korean companies, universities and state think tanks together spent 24.15 
trillion won (US$25.03 billion) on R&D in 2005, 2.99 per cent of the country’s GDP, 
up 8.9 per cent from 2004 (see figure 1). Secured public funding for 2006 is 
US$8.65 billion, a 15 per cent increase over 2005.29 The government plans to 
increase R&D from 4.8 per cent of total government expenditure in 2003 to 7 per 
cent by 2007. The budget for key ‘new growth’ technologies will rise from 28.5 per 
cent of the total in 2004 to 50 per cent by 2012.30
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Rankings of quality
Competitiveness ranking out of 25 countries
Innovativeness ranking out of 25 countries
Networked readiness index rank 
(out of 104 countries)
WEF global competitiveness 
(out of 127 countries)
Ease to start a new business 
(out of 104 countries)
Quality of education system 
(out of 104 countries)
Quality of math and science education 
(out of 104 countries)
Transparency 
(out of 163 countries)
Figure
– 13th in 2005
– 5th in 2010
– 15th
– 24th
– 24th
– 44th
– 60th
– 41st
– 42nd
Source
Deloitte’s 
Competitiveness 
Index 200523
Deloitte’s 
Competitiveness 
Index 2005
WEF and INSEAD
200524
WEF 2006/07
WEF 200525
WEF 2005
WEF 2005
The 2006 
Transparency 
International 
Corruption 
Perceptions 
Index26
Figure 1 Trend of R&D expenditure and the ratio of R&D to GDP
   Source: MOST, ‘Status and trend of total R&D expenditure’, available at www.most.go.kr/ 
  (accessed 5 Dec 2006).
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Private industry has caught up with and surpassed the government’s R&D 
spending, now accounting for 75 per cent of total R&D expenditure. In 2006, 
R&D investment by private industry rose 16 per cent from 2005, after increasing 
17 per cent the year before.31 Several Korean industries put 8 per cent of turnover 
into R&D32 as they look for the next growth engines beyond shipbuilding and 
semi-conductors, in biotech, nanotech and environmental technologies. Korea’s 
multinationals are now shaping the direction of science and technology.
Small companies are also investing more in R&D. In 2006, small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) invested 5.7 trillion won, up 22.2 per cent on the previous year, 
compared with 19.1 trillion won by large companies up 14.8 per cent.33 The small 
firms’ share of R&D doubled between 1995 and 2001, from 11.4 per cent to 23.6 
per cent.34 SMEs spent 3.58 per cent of sales on R&D in 2004, comparable to their 
bigger counterparts.35
However, over-reliance on private funding can also create vulnerabilities. 
Basic science may be neglected, especially if private funding is cut in response 
to recession. A 2006 World Bank report on Korea’s knowledge economy notes 
that if the 1997 crash had lasted any longer, the 14 per cent cut in private R&D 
it caused could have inflicted long-term damage on the system.36
In the past, risk and vulnerability was mitigated by government maintaining a tight 
rein on business and the economy. However, the Korean research and innovation 
system today remains closed to outsiders. Though it ranks higher than other east 
Asian innovation systems on a number of measures, FDI outflows and inflows are 
the exception (see figure 2).37 The ratio of foreign sources of funds to total R&D in 
Korea in 2004 (0.5 per cent) was low compared with countries like France (8 per 
cent) and the UK (19.4 per cent), which have similar levels of R&D expenditure.38
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Figure 2 Innovation system variables, South Korea and east Asian nations compared
   Source: World Bank, see http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam/scorecard_adv_param.asp 
(accessed 6 Dec 2006).
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Gradually, the picture is changing. Patents filed in Korea by foreign-owned firms 
rose to 3.7 per cent of patents filed between 1998 and 2005.39 Government 
innovation agencies regard encouraging FDI as vital to develop the quality of 
research. Yet Korea still ranks next-to-last in a ranking of foreign ownership of 
domestic inventions.40 Koreans might argue this means they will reap the benefits 
of endogenous innovation, rather than foreign investors.
There is little doubting the quality of Korea’s hard infrastructure for research: the 
facilities and the equipment. Korea is one of the few countries in the world with a 
ministry dedicated to development of information and communications technology 
(ICT). Korea’s broadband infrastructure is ranked number one in the world. But the
 ‘software’ on which innovation relies is much weaker. The system is still bedevilled 
by bureaucracy. Despite reforms since the 1997 economic crisis, public institutions 
and business culture remains slow to adapt, especially to international collaboration 
and investment.
Outputs
Korea’s scientific competitiveness seems to be improving markedly. Its science 
ranking rose four places from 19th to 15th, and technology six places from eighth 
to second.41 According to the World Economic Forum, Korea’s technology ranking 
jumped two places to seventh, and overall competitiveness hovers around 24th.42
On the face of it Korea is producing far more science than it did. Korean scientists 
are publishing and patenting more frequently. The Science Citation Index (SCI) 
shows South Korea’s publication output increasing dramatically between 1981 and 
2003, and the trend is still upwards (see figure 3).43 Korea’s 11-year average ranking 
(1995–2005) among 147 top performing countries in publications was 15th.44
Korean science is strongest in areas such as materials science, chemistry and 
physics, according to an analysis by Thomson Scientific. In materials research, 
for example, South Korea’s citations-per-paper average was just 1 per cent below 
the world average.45
Yet while Korean scientists publish a lot, their work is not frequently cited by 
other scientists. In 2005 Korea could not claim a position in the top 20 countries 
for citations.46 Injections of cash into the research system have boosted publication 
outputs, but it will take time for the research ecosystem to grow roots and 
branches elsewhere.
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 1 FDI inflows as % of GDP
 2 Science and engineering enrolment ratio (%)
 3 Science enrolment ratio (%)
 4 Researchers in R&D
 5 Researchers in R&D / million people
 6 Total expenditure for R&D as % of GDP
 7 University–company research collaboration
 8 Scientific and technical journal articles
 9 Scientific and technical journal articles / million people
 10 Availability of venture capital
 11 Patents granted by USPTO
 12 Patents granted by USPTO / million people
 13 High-tech exports as % of manufacturing exports
 14 Private sector spending on R&D
 15 Firm-level technology absorption
 16 FDI outflows as % of GDP
Figure 4 Growth in US patents* 1992–2005
   *Patents issued by the US Patent and Trademark Office
  Source: US Patent and Trademark Office http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/cst_utl.htm
Figure 3 Annual output in science
 Source: Thomson Scientific national science indicators
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Patenting, especially in areas of manufacturing strength like ICT, is a different story. 
Led by Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics, Korea files five times as many 
patents for US dollar of GDP spent on R&D as industrialised European countries.47 
Korea ranks third in the world in ICT measured by patent counts. Korea had the 
largest increase in patent intensity ratio – number of triadic patent families divided 
by industry-financed R&D expenditures – in the 1990s48 and the highest growth in 
the US patent system from 1986 to 200349 (see figure 4).
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Figure 5 Contribution of knowledge to GDP growth
  Source: World Bank staff estimates, ‘Overview’, Korea as a Knowledge Economy.
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The number of patents filed in Europe also increased dramatically in the 1990s, 
though the overall share of Korea’s patents remains low.50
Korea now has the third largest patenting office in the world. The current number 
of patent applications per year is 240,195, almost 500 times the number filed in the 
first year of the intellectual property (IP) rights system in 1949.51 IP protection has 
been a major focus of recent reforms. Revisions to the patent act in January 2006 
expanded the novelty standard: patents cannot be granted if the item has been 
publicly known outside, as well as inside, Korea.52
Bibliometrics and patenting measures need to be handled with care. But these 
figures show that Korea’s economic growth is increasingly due to knowledge 
accumulation rather than labour costs or productivity (see figure 5).53
Given where South Korea started in only 1960 it boasts an impressive knowledge 
scorecard.54
Collaboration, both domestically and internationally, is underdeveloped, but 
improving. From 1987 to 1997, Korea’s Advanced Institute of Science and 
Technology (KAIST) produced the largest number of ICT-related papers, with 
Seoul National University close behind, mainly from individual authors. However, 
the share of joint university–public and university–company papers is increasing, 
amounting to 20 per cent of the total papers published.55 Smaller firms seem to be 
more collaborative: cooperation with other firms, universities and research institutes 
rose from 16.3 per cent of technology developments by SMEs in 1991, to close 
to 60 per cent at the end of the century.56
The share of internationally co-authored papers has stayed constant at about 27–28 
per cent over the last decade. Collaboration with countries other than the US is on 
the increase. According to National Science Foundation data from 1994 to 2003,57 
Korean collaboration with the US as measured by co-authored articles fell from 65 
per cent in 1994 to 47 per cent in 2003 (see figure 6).
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Figure 6 Korea science and engineering article co-authorships with the US
  Source: Science and Engineering Indicators 2006, US National Science Foundation, 
  www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06/ (accessed 6 Dec 2006).
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Yet the data also point to Korea’s weakness. Overall levels of scientific publications 
and patents say little about their quality. Korean inputs – spend on R&D – do not 
automatically lead to productivity or technological outputs. As we will see in later 
chapters, the processes by which Korea transitions from a hierarchical and closed 
system to one that is domestically and internationally networked and open will 
involve challenging social norms. Korea may be measuring the wrong things.
The Korean system
Whether Korea can maintain its momentum, while also improving quality and 
extending international collaboration, will depend in large part on how its innovation 
system is steered by the state.
At first sight the Korean innovation system seems clearly organised. The Ministry 
of Science and Technology (MOST) focuses on improving fundamental research 
and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE), on applied research 
and industrial technology programmes. The reality is more complex. MOST, 
for example, funds national R&D programmes that have a strategic focus on 
fundamental technologies, core infrastructures and applied next-generation 
technologies. Moreover, 16 other ministries and countless agencies have a role 
in innovation policy.
One of the most frequent criticisms of the Korean system is not that it is planned 
but that on the contrary there is too little strategy and too much duplication 
between competing ministries and plans. In recognition of the risks of confusion 
MOST has been given an oversight role to make sure resources are used efficiently 
and agencies collaborate effectively.
The Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) also plays a critical role. 
Its objectives include the development of advanced communication network 
technology, acquisition of indigenous computer technology, and development 
of communication devices and software technology. Former MIC minister Daeje 
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Chin went to Stanford, worked at Bell Laboratories, and was the CEO of Samsung 
before serving the longest of any MIC ministers, a total of three years. President 
Roh asked him to recreate the MIC as a growth engine for the new economy. Chin 
developed the U-Korea IT839 Strategy vision, which is credited with ensuring Korea 
has the most developed IT infrastructure in the world.
Korea is not short of long-term visions that underpin its commitment to science 
and technology. Alongside five-year economic and science and technology plans, 
separate foresight exercises set ambitious targets. These have been particularly 
influential in shaping the development of Korean science.
In the 1980s, for example, more than 800 experts contributed to the ‘Long-range 
plan for science and technology development toward the year 2000’.58 Three 
major foresight exercises were conducted after that, one in 1994 to inform the
 ‘G-7’ or HAN (Highly Advanced National) R&D projects, and another in 1999 when 
Korea embarked on an ambitious Vision 2025 strategy involving 200 experts to
 ‘transform the national innovation system from the government-initiated, inward-
looking and development-oriented system into a market-driven, diffusion-oriented, 
globally networked system’.59 Vision 2025: Korea’s long-term plan for science and 
technological development is a blueprint for how Korea should tackle
the paradigm shifts of the twenty-first century; a knowledge-based information 
society generating wealth from ideas, not materials; attainment of ‘unlimited’ 
and free competition between countries; and a new value system focused on 
personalisation, diversification and improving quality of life.60
From 2003 to 2004, the latest national foresight exercise to 2030 attempted to link 
science and technology to social needs and global challenges.61 These long-term 
visions have been complemented by technology roadmaps to align government 
research programmes with likely market developments in the following ten years. In 
2003, Korea designated ten technologies as drivers of economic growth until 2008. 
From the early 2000s, Korea began investing heavily in developing core technologies 
through the ‘21st Century Frontier R&D Programs’. These ten-year projects include 
IT and materials, but also environmental, bio and nano technologies.
These foresight exercises help to foster consensus about likely technological 
developments and mobilise public and private resources around key areas. 
As one senior official put it: ‘S&T policy needs to be about selection and 
concentration. We can’t cover everything.’ Yet the impressive commitments in these 
long-term programmes have also attracted scepticism. In 2000, Moo-Young Han, 
editor-in-chief of the Korean American Forum and a professor of physics at Duke 
University, wrote a scathing critique of the G-7 projects and their new incarnation, 
the ‘21st Century Frontier R&D Programs’: ‘Different name, different policy-makers, 
the same money, the same old research culture, or the lack of it.’62 His criticisms 
echoed familiar themes, namely that research is top-down with MOST at the helm, 
that duplication is rife and individual creativity stifled. Only recently have these 
foresight exercises started to engage the Korean public in debates about the 
direction S&T policy should take. But the government may have no choice but 
to take a more arms-length approach. In the case of biotechnology, for example, 
the government lacks the scientific expertise to know how to plan research.63
To understand where Korea may be headed on its headlong race from postwar 
poverty to knowledge economy, we need to look beyond the numbers. We turn 
first to people, the resource on which Korea is pinning its hopes for the future.
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Skilling up a nation
Top five destination countries for tertiary level 
Korean students studying abroad in 2004 
(total 95,885)
Source: Global Education Digest 2006
Professor Robert Laughlin sits in his office on the third floor of an unremarkable 
building surrounded by quiet administrative efficiency. A white-haired Nobel prize 
winning physicist, in 2004 he became President of Korea’s Advanced Institute of 
Science and Technology (KAIST) – the first foreigner to occupy the position. His 
brief was to bring the university into the twenty-first century.
After Japanese occupation and the Korean war, South Korea’s greatest resource 
was its hard-working and increasingly well-educated population. Now science is 
increasingly used to project national power and potency, and KAIST is at the heart 
of Korean ambitions.
Just weeks before we met in March 2006, the National Assembly had ratified 
Laughlin’s $97-million ‘globalisation package’ to fund promising spin-offs, increase 
foreign faculty by 15 per cent, and require all classes to be taught in English by 2010.
Laughlin’s plan provoked a mutiny. Furious professors refused to go along with 
the reforms. Laughlin’s view was that he was caught between a government that 
wanted reform but had no idea how to pursue it, and a university establishment that 
would not budge. He describes the government’s decision to bring him in as ‘an act 
of desperation’ that he says is being repeated across northeast Asia.
It is not the first time that universities have been at the heart of protest over Korea’s 
development. In the 1970s and 1980s, universities provided the base for protest 
against the Korean dictator Chun Doo Hwan. Today professors in those same 
universities are protesting against government moves to make Korean universities 
adopt a more market-oriented, US model for teaching and research.
These debates over the future of Korean universities go to the heart of what kind 
of innovative society Korea might become. There is an almost unquestioning belief 
in Korea that science and technology are good for society. President Roh in his 
inaugural speech declared: ‘I will help the rebirth of our country by promoting 
uninterrupted innovation in science and technology.’64 But training a skilled labour 
force to work for rapid industrialisation, within a largely planned economy, is a very 
different challenge from educating people for innovation. Many in Korea seem 
unready for what innovation might entail.
More scientists will find themselves pulled in different directions by the unfolding 
tensions that marked both Dr Hwang and Professor Laughlin’s careers. Hwan-suk 
Kim, who runs the Center for Democracy in Science and Technology (CDST), says 
that Hwang tapped into a potent mixture of insecurity and ambition in Korea: ‘His 
style was very dangerous. Korea is still a very weak country and has a long way 
to go to become competitive, and he tapped into this insecurity.’ As government 
pushes universities to deliver more tangible and commercially valuable research, 
many of their faculty, as Laughlin found, will try to head in the opposite direction.
Yet beneath these battles among the country’s scientific elite, another set of 
possibilities is taking shape: the potential for Korea to spawn mass innovation 
from a highly educated population.
Training for industrial growth
Education has been central to Korea’s rise. At the end of Japanese occupation in 
1945, literacy levels were extremely low and only 800 Koreans had graduated from 
university.65 Education institutions were moulded to the needs of export-oriented 
industry, and strong links between firms and vocational high schools enabled a 
skilled workforce to develop that was loyal to the company.66 The system today 
remains highly competitive, and is based mainly on rote memorisation.67
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Education investment increased from 2.5 per cent of GDP in 1951 to 17 per cent 
in 1966, and literacy rates began to rise.68 By 2006, the share of 25–34-year-olds 
with at least an upper-secondary qualification surpassed 95 per cent, the highest 
of all OECD countries.69 Education is a national obsession in Korea. It is common 
for children to be sent abroad to study English at the age of 10 or 11. Children also 
work late into the night doing homework and attend crammers to train them for 
highly competitive exams. Their score dictates what schools they can apply for. 
At the age of 15, Koreans lead the world in maths and sciences.
 Three features of the system stand out. First, the continued reliance on rote learning 
even when promoting reforms. One high school student we met had just returned 
from living for five years in Canada with relatives, and was studying for entrance 
exams, in a rented room, until past midnight every day. She practised for a verbal 
exam in a way that sounded like rehearsing for a play: the greetings, manner of 
entering the room and responses are rehearsed by rote even by students who can 
speak English fluently.
Second, families are prepared to make huge sacrifices for the sake of education 
and learning English in particular. The preferred choice is still to send students 
abroad to learn rather than to bring faculty to Korea, although the number of foreign 
faculty in universities has grown slightly in recent years. Korea’s overseas education 
and training deficit hovered around US$700 million in 2001 and continues to rise.70 
Overall, students are more mobile and, in global terms, the number of Korean 
students travelling for study is surpassed only by China and Japan. In 2004, 
187,683 students went abroad, a 17.4 per cent increase from the year before. 
Though just over half of students go to the US to study, about 40,000 students 
study in China, which is seen as a second choice option. ‘That’s only if they can’t 
get into university in Korea,’ one professor told me. In 2004, just 4 per cent of 
Korean students studied in the UK in spite of the huge interest in English language.71
Third, education is a public–private undertaking. Public spending on education 
remains just below the OECD average, at 4.79 per cent of GDP. Yet private 
education spending is much higher than any other OECD country at 3.41 per cent.72 
Approximately 85 per cent of four-year universities are private (145 out of 171).73
The Korean secondary education system is widely admired for producing well-drilled 
children who top the league tables for maths and sciences at the age of 15. But that 
lead gets whittled away quickly, it seems, at the graduate level.
Table 3 Growth in higher education between 1970 and 2004
Year Number of institutions Enrolment
1970 142 201,436
1980 343 601,494
1990 270 1,691,681
2000 372 3,363,549
2004 411 3,555,115
  Source: Education statistics, Korea Education Development Institute.
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Universities have expanded dramatically since the 1980s (see table 3), and are 
slowly becoming less centrally regulated. The government says it sees its role as 
setting the framework for universities to develop with guidelines for the percentage 
of recruits or amount of research. Korea stands out from other countries, especially 
for those at its level of economic development, for sending high proportions of 
students into science and engineering: 39.9 per cent or three times as many as 
the US.74 Universities with science-related degrees tend to be ranked the highest.75
More than 80 per cent of Koreans go into higher education but there are significant 
doubts about its quality. University education tends to be highly departmentalised 
and rigid. Korea’s universities rank low in global terms.
Students must go abroad to attend the best universities in the world, contributing 
to Korea’s own ‘brain drain’. Though KAIST and POSTECH ranked first and second 
according to AsiaWeek’s ‘Asia’s best universities 2000 report’,76 KAIST was 143rd in 
the world in 2005 (up from 160th in 2004) and POSTECH did not make the top 
200.77 Korea’s top universities are all too aware of their low global rankings. 
Professor Han who heads international collaboration at POSTECH made a special 
trip to England to discuss the Times Higher Education Supplement methodology 
when the rankings came out in 2005. Professor Han argues that perceptions of 
Korea lag behind changes in technology: even 20 years ago, POSTECH was on an 
equal technological footing with the world.
Reforming education: from elite to mass to universal
In response to criticism of the rigidity of basic education and the low quality of 
higher education, a string of reforms have been launched. The Ministry of Education 
is promoting the goal of ubiquitous and personalised education, using technology 
to tailor learning to individual need. In 1999, the government launched the Brain 
Korea 21 (BK21) project to invest $1.2 billion over seven years to bring Korea 
towards a ‘knowledge-based society’ through boosting graduate education, 
developing an R&D workforce, increasing university–industry collaboration and 
improving creativity.78 About 70 per cent of BK21 funding was earmarked for 
graduate students and postdoctorates, allowing them to concentrate on research. 
The aim was to ‘leap’ into the world’s top ten in SCI-level publications after 2005. 
Through the New University for Regional Innovation (NURI) project, $1.4 million has 
been allocated over five years to 2008 to develop undergraduate education outside 
the Seoul metropolitan area. The second phase of the BK21 project from 2006 
to 2013 will address the issue of quality of research and collaboration between 
university and industry, especially in rural areas.
Yet many commentators doubt whether the investment will lead to the changes 
in culture and thinking required. The former president of SNU, Professor Un-Chan 
Chung, thinks a new vision for Korean innovation is needed: ‘The investment-based 
growth strategy has reached its limits, but a new strategy suited to this era, which 
we think should be an innovation-based strategy, has not yet fully taken hold.’79 
The goal of his reforms at Korea’s most prestigious university was to ‘teach 
students how to cope with the changing world’. In his view, a university should 
create ideas that could have potentially huge spill-overs, not simply transfer 
technology to industry. Professor Chung remarked:
The values of openness, disinterestedness, and cooperation will come to be seen 
as equally important as market principles and global standards… We don’t know 
what the state of the university will be in three or five years. It’s not stable.
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Professor Laughlin is no longer president of KAIST. In July 2006, after trying to shake 
KAIST free from state dependence, his contract was not renewed.80 The old adage
 ‘politics is harder than physics’ proved true. His story is also further proof that Korea 
will not be able to rely on star individuals or quick fixes for systemic problems.
Korea’s work culture – characterised by discipline, hard work and determination – 
propelled the country’s industrialisation. Yet the educational institutions that 
produced such a competent, driven and efficient industrial workforce may well 
be ill-equipped to create a workforce for an innovative society. Repeated efforts 
to reform the system – to introduce more personalisation and creativity into basic 
education; more individual initiative into higher education; better systems for 
research – have run into repeated opposition and obstacles. Korea wants to 
become an innovative society but its educational institutions and culture are still 
heavily slanted towards industrialisation. The tensions between the two will continue 
to generate conflicts of the kind that derailed Robert Laughlin for years to come.
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Hubs, Seoul and CyWorld
Tom Collins’s enthusiasm cannot hide his exhaustion. Tom is one of 300 staff 
working at the offices of the Incheon Free Economic Zone (IFEZ) just outside Seoul, 
created to attract foreign high-tech investment to the self-styled knowledge hub of 
northeast Asia. Tom, an American, is the only non-Korean on the staff. It is his job, 
almost single-handedly, to make the zone attractive to foreign investors. After our 
whistle-stop tour he is due to meet an international education company considering 
setting up a school in the zone.
  Forty miles from Seoul, on the way to Incheon airport, past drab, 
brown high-rise apartment blocks, there are few signs of what is 
planned: at the zone’s heart will be Songdo, a city with ubiquitous 
broadband infrastructure due to come to life in 2010. Incheon is 
self-consciously positioning itself as ‘The Manhattan of northeast 
Asia’, an open and cosmopolitan place, more connected to the 
global economy than to the rest of Korea. A 12.3km latter day 
Brooklyn Bridge will carry cars to the nearby international airport 
in just 15 minutes. An area of 209 square kilometres, much of 
it reclaimed from the sea, will support a population of half a million 
people, mainly employed in high-tech jobs.
IFEZ stands for the future Korea wants to project to the world: knowledge-based 
businesses in a cosmopolitan setting, with everyone connected through ubiquitous 
communications. How IFEZ develops, not just in terms of infrastructure, but also its 
culture, will determine what kinds of innovation it may produce. IFEZ will be a test 
bed for how traditional Korean recipes for economic development may combine 
or clash with its ambitions to become a hub for global innovation.
The US government played little direct role in the growth of Silicon Valley. By 
contrast, IFEZ is a deliberate creation of central government in part because local 
government in Korea is so weak. South Korea’s dictatorship allowed for no local 
government. The first time that mayors were publicly elected was 1995. Perhaps 
it is no surprise that regional development is lagging.
The Ministry of Communications is investing $400 million in Songdo’s ubiquitous 
wireless infrastructure to realise a vision of ‘U-life’, where everything someone 
needs, from their house key to their health details, will be on one smart card. 
The Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries is building the port infrastructure. 
Everywhere ministries are heavily involved in the details of what is being planned.
The brochures say IFEZ will be cosmopolitan, a place where foreigners and 
Koreans can mix as equals. Yet there is real doubt about how many foreign 
companies it will attract. By early 2006 about 45 Korean companies had applied 
for space in a hundred-acre bio complex. Foreign investors have been harder to 
find. Tom and his team are scouring the world to attract star researchers with 
carefully targeted incentives. Yet still culture stands in the way.
 ‘London is international and people feel comfortable there,’ Tom explained. ‘In the 
US, there is a sense that “our ethnicity is the world’s ethnicity”. By contrast, Korea, 
once dubbed the ‘hermit kingdom’, is ‘very developed technologically, but also very 
provincial to international visitors’. It is not just culture that’s a problem but money 
as well. Tom explained: ‘Korea is a very cash-rich economy at the moment. They 
don’t need the FDI, so how aggressive does the government really want to be in 
attracting it?’
 ‘‘ ’’The Manhattan of northeast Asia 
Incheon Free 
Economic Zone
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Clusters
It is conventional wisdom that innovation emerges from tightly knit clusters that 
bring together sources of knowledge, universities and research centres, with 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. California’s Silicon Valley is the prime example 
of a dynamic cluster which brings together these ingredients through high-velocity 
labour markets and high levels of immigration. However, Silicon Valley is just one 
cluster model. Other countries have developed different models. These have 
tended to be based on a university and its science park, the model that started the 
Cambridge phenomenon in the UK; deliberate government investment to create 
technopoles, the approach taken in France; clusters based around larger businesses, 
the model that emerged along Route 128 around Boston; or clusters based on a 
dominant city such as Helsinki in Finland. What kinds of clusters will Korea create?
Seoul
Seoul is the centre of gravity of economic, political and cultural activity – the main 
magnet for talent and research. Seoul Metropolitan Area comprises 11.8 per cent 
of the nation’s territory but its population has increased from 20.8 per cent of the 
national total in 1960 to 47.9 per cent in 2004 and is forecast to reach 50 per cent 
by 2011.81 About 70 per cent of students who ranked in the top 4 per cent in the 
Scholastic Aptitude Test for entrance to university were enrolled in universities in 
Seoul. Out of 327,740 admissions places in universities in Korea, 114,908 are in 
Seoul and nearby areas. Seoul is home to the Korea Institute of Science and 
Technology, the oldest and most outward-looking government research institute, 
and the most prestigious university, SNU. Crucially perhaps, Seoul is also home 
to the new wave of Korean entrepreneurs in digital media and culture. It is Korea 
at its most cosmopolitan.
 Venture capital firms and the stars of the gaming industry congregate in the city’s 
Kangnam district, just south of the river, which teems with young people visiting 
shops, restaurants and PC bangs, the internet cafés where they congregate to play
 ‘massive multiplayer online role-playing games’ (MMORPGs).
  Seoul will remain the main magnet for talent and the main source 
of innovation in Korea. Seoul’s dominance, however, has prompted 
a string of attempts to create alternative centres for growth and 
innovation. Since 1995, MOST has created two or three regional 
research centres in each provincial area to encourage cooperation 
between universities and small businesses. Science and 
engineering research centres located in universities are meant 
to connect research interests to local businesses. The Industrial 
Research Cluster Support Program, launched in 2002, 
encourages SMEs to work closely together to find synergies and 
cooperate in the development of new technologies. The 
government also supports nine industrial research clusters.
Daedeok science town
By far the most impressive initiative is the Daedeok ‘Innopolis’.82 Daedeok Valley 
is an integrated industrial belt, which includes a clutch of towns such as Daejeon, 
and industrial parks in Chungbuk-do Jeollabuk-do. At its heart is Daedeok 
Innopolis, a mass of publicly funded research complexes covering 6849.5 acres 
close to Daejeon, more than four times the size of IFEZ.
Built in 1973, Daedeok Innipolis has 56 research institutes, more than 6000 PhD 
researchers and accounts for 10 per cent of the aggregate research power in 
Korea. KAIST was relocated to Daedeok in 1989, and Daejeon is also home to the 
National Central Science Museum, Chungnam University and the newly reopened 
Expo Science Park.
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Daedeok’s concentration of scientists and researchers seems very impressive. 
Yet in other respects the idea of innovation emerging from a state-planned science 
city cut off from the rest of the economy seems old fashioned. The number of spin-
off ventures created in Daedeok grew from 40 in 1995 to 2000 in 2005, with 45 
per cent of those in the IT sector and 15 per cent in biotech.83 But it is far from 
clear that Daedeok will become a Silicon Valley style centre for innovation or even 
match the Hsinchu Park in Taiwan that has spawned thousands of semi-conductor 
companies, many of them now very large.
Several other places, each deploying a different approach to cluster development, 
could play a role in future Korean innovation.
Pohang
Pohang, located in Gyeongsanbuk province on Korea’s east coast, is not a first 
choice tourist destination, perhaps because it is home to the Pohang Iron and Steel 
Company (POSCO), founded in 1968 and now the world’s second-largest steel 
producer, producing 28 million tons of steel products each year.
POSCO helped to found POSTECH, Asia’s number two science and technology 
university,84 which in 1994 received an endowment from POSCO ensuring its future. 
The alliance between the steel company and the university could yet produce 
significant innovation.
A case in point is PAL, Pohang Accelerator Laboratory, a national user facility which 
houses an electron linear accelerator and synchrotron radiation light source.
In Soo Ko, director of the physics department at PAL, explains it got off the ground 
only by trading with Chinese and Japanese to get the technology required. ‘We 
learned a lot from the Chinese,’ he said. Local researchers and companies use 
the lab. Ko proudly relates that the experiment behind the first Nature cover story 
on Korean research was done at PAL: work in 2003 on Viagra and Alzheimer’s by 
Crystal Genomics and KAIST. Next door, completed in 2006, is one of Korea’s five 
nanotechnology support facilities, the National Center for Nanomaterials Technology 
(NCNT). The combination of the accelerator and the latest nanotechnology 
instruments aims to keep them at the cutting edge of materials research.
POSCO is looking for new growth areas, and POSTECH, while maintaining its 
physics and chemistry strengths, is moving into biotechnology. POSTECH Biotech 
Center was established in 2000, funded partly by POSCO (40 per cent) and by 
pharmaceutical companies (60 per cent). Major R&D areas include molecular 
medicine, biochips and biochemical engineering, plant systems biology, DNA 
and adenovirus-based preventative vaccines and diabetes treatment research.
Busan
Further south down the coast, Busan, in neighbouring Gyeongsangnam province, 
is the second-largest city in the country and one of the world’s top three ports.
The Busan port, which first opened in 1876, is now being expanded to include 30 
new shipping berths by 2011. This will also allow the current port to be redeveloped 
by 2015 into a multipurpose logistics and commerce centre, incorporating an 
exhibition and cultural centre, leisure park and international passenger terminal. 
Busan-Jinhae Free Economic Zone will compete with IFEZ for foreign investment 
in high-tech manufacturing.
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Gwangju
Gwangju Technopark in Gwangju, Korea’s sixth largest city, is a prime example 
of attempts to create a stronger regional innovation system. Founded in 1998, it is 
one of 13 regional technoparks. Founder James Moon acknowledges that policies
 ‘legislated and implemented from the top are no longer relevant in the era of 
globalisation’ and have ‘deepened regional tensions and endangered national 
cohesion’.85 Gwangju Technopark houses 18 venture companies and specialises 
particularly in optical communications, photonics and LED/LD technologies. It is 
actively seeking to increase its international links.
Regional innovation
Regional innovation committees, to bring together universities, government and 
business, operate in 116 cities and counties. In addition, at least three complexes 
run by private companies are home to some of Korea’s best R&D. One of these is 
a semi-conductor cluster in Suwon, a key stop on the railway from Seoul to Busan 
and home to large parts of Samsung Electronics. An LCD cluster in Paju and the 
new materials cluster in Pohang are also privately owned.
Wireless clusters and ubiquitous innovation
Cutting across all these attempts to create geographic clusters, however, is Korea’s 
heavy investment in broadband infrastructure, which may prove to be the distinctive 
ingredient in the Korean approach to innovation. Ubiquitous innovation is central 
to the branding of Songdo in IFEZ. ‘There are really no comparable comprehensive 
frameworks for ubiquitous computing,’ said Anthony Townsend, a research director 
at the Institute for the Future in Palo Alto, California, and a former Fulbright scholar 
in Seoul. ‘U-city is a uniquely Korean idea.’86 If all goes well, Songdo’s ubiquitous 
wireless infrastructure should be a world first, piloting new technologies, lifestyles 
and services.
  We will find out in Korea whether broadband networks can provide 
new non-physical spaces for innovation. By 2008, everywhere in 
Korea will have mobile access to the internet, even while travelling 
at speeds of up to 120km/hour thanks to the WiBro service being 
rolled out by South Korean internet service provider KT and 
mobile phone operator SK Telecom.
  This could also reinvigorate innovation in rural areas. The 
Information Network Village project run by the Ministry of 
Government Administration and Home Affairs has invested more 
than $105 million since 2001 to bring broadband connectivity to 
305 villages. Mexico plans to implement its own version soon. 
Delegations from 65 countries have visited Korea to investigate 
what is seen as a successful example of bridging the digital divide.
Innovation hub of northeast Asia?
Korea itself wants to become a hub for innovation, closely connected to the 
Chinese economy. As chairman of the Presidential Committee on Balanced 
National Development Kyoung-ryung Sung says:
The Korean government is attempting to fundamentally change the national 
development paradigm so that it can increase national wealth and competitiveness 
through an open-door policy and innovation-driven developments based on 
knowledge and technology.87
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Wonki Min
Wonki Min, director of policy coordination at MIC, is both optimistic and honest 
about Korea’s situation: ‘Korea is currently in the awkward position of technologically 
following the EU and Japan, while India and China are just behind us.’ Korea still 
needs a careful strategy, he explained: ‘Korea can’t follow the US football field 
model; we are in a bowling lane and must aim carefully to avoid the gutters.’
The vision he sets out is a northeast Asian regional development model involving 
multinational cooperation:
We have to compete and collaborate and find win–win solutions. Korea wants to 
move towards more future-oriented industry. We can no longer rely on cheap 
labour. Costs here are higher than the Netherlands or Italy.
However places such as IFEZ and Daejeon will face growing competition from 
coastal cities in China that are busy creating their own innovation centres. Regional 
innovation in Korea is relatively weak and venture capital is underdeveloped. Korea’s 
clusters, focused on R&D, often seem cut off from businesses that could exploit 
their know-how. Korea’s clusters seem still to be mainly for Koreans rather than 
being designed for cosmopolitan innovators. As Wonki Min acknowledged:
We have Russian scientists and we’re trying to attract Indians but they don’t want 
to stay here. Chinese people can get huge salaries in China. Support for foreigners 
here is non-existent. We don’t have the edge for attracting foreigners, and we don’t 
want to overpay just to attract them.
A glimpse of the future?
The most potent land in Korea is an uninhabited strip, 155 miles long and 2.5 miles 
wide, 50 miles north of Seoul. Welcome to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), an artefact 
of the Cold War, which divides North and South Korea. Even in the DMZ there are 
glimmers of change. The long-abandoned land in the DMZ is home to farmers who 
grow organic ginseng. A railway station has been built that will open the way for 
travel between north and south. Tourists are even able to have their passports 
marked with a dove-decorated DMZ stamp.
The DMZ also nestles alongside some of the most exciting Korean architecture 
of the last few years. Paju Book City, the centre of Seoul’s publishing industry, 
was a town in crisis in the 1980s. Nearby Heyri was within earshot of the North’s 
propaganda broadcasts. By 2010, more than 400 buildings will have been built 
in the two towns. The area is attracting the attention of architects and designers 
worldwide. Ki-Ung Li, the chairman of Paju Book City, says ‘the idea was to have 
a museum-city, a collection of architecture that acts like a living museum’.88 Paju 
Book City is an award-wining international experiment in modern living, situated 
cheek by jowl with a throwback to the Cold War. It is just possible that as Korea 
develops, both North and South, something surprising and even more creative 
could emerge from this mix.
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Venturing beyond the chaebol
Chris Ko is one of many people involved in innovation in Korea who seem caught 
between the country’s past and its ambitions for its future. A senior vice president 
of the Biolab at Samsung Advanced Institute of Technology (SAIT), Ko was educated 
in the US, founded and then sold a start-up firm, and in 2000 moved to Korea to 
work for Samsung.
Korean companies are struggling to attract foreign managers. The next best thing 
is to bring in a Korean educated abroad. Chris wants to remain open-minded but 
confides it is not easy to live in Korea as an outsider: ‘Samsung is a global company 
but Korea is not a global nation. Samsung tries to be win–win, but by global 
standards, we are behind.’
SAIT, the central R&D unit of Samsung Electronics Business Groups, the most 
profitable arm of Samsung’s businesses, is central to the company’s hopes to 
transform itself into a genuinely global force for innovation.
The 1000 researchers at SAIT, which has an annual budget of $300 million, spend 
80 per cent of their time on existing business – such as LCDs and semi-conductors 
– and 20 per cent on disruptive ‘next generation’ technologies such as biochips 
and fuel cells. The centre abounds with the trappings of US-style innovation. One 
meeting room has been renamed ‘the dream room’. The BIOCHIP lab announces 
that those inside should be ‘Brave, Innovative, Open-minded, Creative… Pioneers’.
Samsung Electronics spent $5.44 billion on R&D in 2005, up from $1.88 billion 
four years ago.89 Samsung’s labs employ more PhDs than government research 
institutes. Ko explained:
Given we have zero natural resources, Korea can’t mimic other innovation models. 
We need to be a knowledge economy. The role of government should be to provide 
high-risk infrastructure, good seed technology and job creation. The real innovation 
happens in the companies. Government should invent and business should re-invent 
to make it marketable.
He believes the time has come to break decisively with Korea’s protectionist, 
techno-nationalist past to foster a more transparent, outward-looking business 
culture: ‘Has our growth relied on innovation? No, it’s relied on personal sacrifice. 
Lack of openness and transparency is productivity lost.’
People like Chris Ko, working at companies like Samsung, are at the leading edge 
of change in Korea, promoting a more cosmopolitan business culture open to 
innovation. SAIT is looking for people who have spent at least 10 per cent of their 
career abroad and display a personal commitment to innovation.
Even Samsung Electronics, however, cannot entirely escape the tensions of a 
system that claims to promote free thinking but measures innovation ruthlessly.
The experience of YoungHyun Kim, a researcher in the Telecommunications 
R&D centre, another of Samsung’s 17 research global research centres, exemplifies 
these tensions. After getting a masters’ degree in 2001, YoungHyun Kim went into 
the optical engineering business of Samsung Electronics and now works in the 
Fab Lab. Signing on to work at Samsung was not as desirable as going abroad, 
but allowed him to opt out of military service and stay near his ageing father. 
YoungHyun Kim spends his days with 1000 other researchers – physicists, 
electrical engineers and a handful of chemists – delivering research to tight 
deadlines. Researchers are expected to write one or two patents a year. 
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Each patent wins a bonus. At times it is almost like working in an innovation factory.
YoungHyun Kim’s experience shows that even the most global of Korea’s chaebol, 
which prides itself on being open to free thinkers, alert to fluid trends in fast-moving 
consumer markets, also relies on the ethic of hard work and self-sacrifice that 
propelled Korea’s postwar development. Korea’s goals may have changed but 
many of its managerial recipes remain untouched.
Business expenditure accounts for three-quarters of Korean R&D. So whether 
Korean businesses can manage home-grown innovation, as opposed to adapting 
technology developed in the West, will be critical to realising the country’s hopes 
of becoming an innovative nation. And at the heart of that issue is the future of 
Korea’s large companies: its chaebol.
Old habits die hard
The conglomerates or chaebol – large, family-owned industrial groupings such 
as Hyundai, LG, Daewoo and Samsung – laid the foundation for South Korea’s 
development in the 1960s and 1970s by working hand in glove with the government 
to promote rapid, export-led growth. The government fostered fierce competition 
between chaebol, and though the overall number of chaebol-affiliated companies 
grew to 677 in 1994 from 77 in 1974, only a few of the originals survive. Most 
evolved from small businesses – LG started as a small face cream producer – and 
grew through rapid learning under effective management in spite of the political 
turmoil. ‘Chaebol have been and will be the dominant factor in Korea’s 
industrialization and globalization.’90
In the early days the chaebol did little R&D. Instead they mainly licensed or copied 
western technologies to create low-cost products for export. In the late 1970s, 
following the Technology Development Promotion Act 1972, ‘like clockwork, the 
biggest chaebol all opened R&D laboratories and then smaller enterprises followed 
suit’, says Alice Amsden in Asia’s Next Giant, her account of Korea’s rise.91 As the 
chaebol caught up with Japan, technologies like D-RAM and CDMA were developed 
domestically in the 1980s and 1990s.
The Asian currency crisis of 1997 brought all that to an end. The Korean economy 
plunged into recession, and society into a state of shock. The current account 
deficit grew to 3 per cent of GDP, export growth which had been over 30 per cent 
decreased to 15 per cent, compounded by a slump in world prices for Korea’s 
staple exports – chips, ships and automobiles. Many of Korea’s largest companies, 
once thought too big to fail, were brought to their knees as the stock market 
plummeted. In exchange for International Monetary Fund (IMF) support to shore up 
its finances, South Korea was forced to engage in what was seen as fundamental 
financial and corporate restructuring.
The traditionally family-owned chaebol had to reduce or relinquish family holdings 
and allow foreign investment, management by boards of trustees and more 
transparent accounting. Those that survived did so while increasing their investment 
in innovation. The number of science and engineering papers authored by Korean 
companies dropped before and during the economic crisis. But both the number of 
papers and the proportion internationally co-authored rose dramatically afterwards 
(see figure 7).
Wan-Joo Kim, founder of C-TRI, a small pharmaceutical company, and one of the 
first researchers who returned from the US to work at the Korea Institute of Science 
and Technology, described the change: ‘Before 1997, we were only imitating. Now it 
is totally different.’
34 Business
Figure 7 Korean science and engineering articles
  Source: Science and Engineering Indicators 2006, US National Science Foundation.
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Large Korean companies now routinely invest large sums in R&D, dwarfing spending 
by their peers in Europe. In 2003, the top ten companies in Korea invested just over 
4 per cent of their sales revenue in R&D. The top 20 companies invested slightly 
less, 3.6 per cent, and the company average of those surveyed by MOST was 
2.28 per cent. In the UK, the top companies spend 1.8 per cent of sales on R&D.92 
A third of researchers in Korea’s top five companies (Samsung Electronics, 
LG Electronics, Hyundai Motor Company, POSCO, LG Chemical) have PhDs, 
rising to 41 per cent in the top ten companies, and 48.4 per cent in the top 20.93
Yet the 1997 shock therapy may now be wearing off. There are some signs of old 
reflexes reappearing. The export-oriented model keeps the Korean economy going: 
in 2005, exports as percentage of real GDP reached 54.3 per cent.94 Management 
scandals continue to be exposed, most recently involving the chairman of Hyundai 
Motor Company.95 Small businesses with products or services that cannot compete 
with the chaebol tend not to survive unless they are aligned with one of the major 
companies. Lifetime employment is still desirable; takeovers are rare. While 
government is investing more in small business support, national technology 
programmes mainly serve the interests of existing businesses. Fear of losing ground 
to emerging Asian competition puts a premium on supporting Korean champions 
rather opening them to challenge from domestic competitors.
Samsung, the global chaebol, may be a symbol of what Korean companies could 
become. Or it could be an exception to the rule.
Outside influence
Unlike China, which has seen a massive inflow of FDI in the last decade, foreign 
companies were never a significant force in Korea’s highly managed economy. 
Again, since 1997 there have been apparently significant changes. Since joining 
the OECD in 1996, Korea’s restrictive regulations on foreign investment have been 
reformed. The Foreign Investment Promotion Act of 1998, revised in 1999, opened 
new sectors to FDI. Overall FDI stocks as a percentage of GDP rose from 2 per cent 
to 9 per cent between 1998 and 2004, and net inflows reached $8 billion in 2004.96 
FDI rose 103 per cent between 2003 and 2005, pushing Korea’s ranking as a 
destination for FDI up 11 places to 16th in the world.97
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Foreign companies are being offered attractive incentives to locate in Korea. The
 ‘Act on Designation and Management of Free Economic Zones’ 2001 lightens the 
regulatory environment for foreign companies operating in free economic zones, 
allowing lower tax rates and looser restrictions on labour. Investors who put more 
than US$10 million into a high-tech industry or more than US$5 million into R&D 
facilities can apply for a cash grant.98 There are tax incentives of up to 100 per cent 
for a maximum of seven years for international companies planning to invest within 
Korea. MOST is creating an organisation within the Korea Industrial Technology 
Association to encourage inward foreign investment in R&D.
Yet these incentives may do little to assuage concerns that many Koreans remain 
hostile to foreign businesses doing well in Korea. Guy de Jonquieres, Asia business 
commentator for the Financial Times, laments the financial uncertainty facing 
foreign investors:
Since 2001, the reform drive has ground to a halt. Some observers say it has gone 
into reverse, enabling Korea’s chaebol conglomerates to reassert their stranglehold, 
stitching up domestic markets and stifling the emergence of new businesses… 
[and]… Parliament is weak.99
Korean youth culture has become cool: the ‘hallryu’ or ‘Korean wave’ of soap 
operas and kimchee has now reached as far afield as California and Mexico. Yet 
despite growing foreign interest in their country, most Koreans remain cautious:
Koreans are having second thoughts about what many, tellingly, call the ‘IMF crisis’. 
Far from being welcomed for helping to rehabilitate its shattered economy, foreign 
investors are being demonised by the local press.100
A recent Pew Institute survey on global attitudes found that five out of six South 
Koreans think that Korea should be protected from foreign influence. This inevitably 
concerns foreign investors ‘who wonder if such views are indicative of the type of 
reception they are likely to receive from government officials, their employees, their 
suppliers and their customers’.101
The small wave
Yet ten years after the 1997 crisis, a few cracks in the chaebol’s dominance of the 
economy are creating space for spin-offs and start-ups to grow. SMEs accounted 
for 87 per cent of employment in Korea in 2004, 42 per cent of exports and 51 per 
cent of domestic manufacturing. Between 1997 and 2004, they created 2.16 million 
jobs. Employment in large companies, by contrast, has declined by 1.22 million in 
that time.102 Government support for small business is increasing. In 1996, the 
central government established the Small and Medium Business Administration 
(SMBA) which runs its own support initiatives and coordinates those of other 
ministries. In January 2006, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy 
(MOCIE) announced a plan to increase the number of ‘leading’ SMEs from 10,000 
to 30,000 by providing new loans and business guarantees.103 Under the scheme 
the Korea Development Bank will increase the amount of funds that can be 
borrowed by leading SMEs to $2.53 billion.104
Biotech
A small but significant share of these new small businesses are in knowledge-
intensive areas. There are more than 600 biotech start-ups in Korea, many 
accredited by the Korean Biotech Venture Association (KOBIOVEN), which helps 
build networks and capacity.
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A prime example is Histostem founded in 2000 by Dr Han Hoon, an immunologist 
originally working at the Catholic University Medical School. After finding that 
a patient’s liver expressed new DNA following a bone marrow transplant, he 
suspected that stem cells must be present in bone marrow and also, therefore, 
in cord blood. He tested this with the approval of the Korean Food and Drug 
Administration in human patients with some success, though he has been criticised 
for bringing his discoveries into clinical practice too fast.
Conducting long-term research in highly uncertain areas is plagued with risk, 
as Dr Han’s business partner YS Kye explained:
We have a problem which Hwang exemplifies: government trusted him and it was 
politically convenient to invest heavily in his work, but there are not enough checks 
and balances in the system. Regulation must be developed alongside treatments 
in these new fields.
Dr Han is cautious about the prospects for Korean biotech, which cannot match 
the funds and skills of multinational pharmaceutical companies. But he believes that 
medicine inspired by eastern philosophies of prevention will create new opportunities 
for Korean companies: ‘We are in an era where the concept of medicine and 
treatment is changing to something other than the western drug approach. Cell 
therapy is a totally new field.’ Korean biotech may succeed – and fail – in the riskier, 
emerging areas where young researchers are not afraid to experiment. These are 
exactly the areas where ethical issues are likely to arise.
International collaboration will also be vital to Korean biotech. Doo-Hong Park 
of Mogam Research Institute, a research spin-off of Green Cross, a Korean 
pharmaceutical company, explained:
Fundamental research is increasing rapidly, but what we lack is experience and 
capability to translate novel findings into products. This will not happen without 
international collaboration… We need global partners to help us build this capacity.
Wong argues that SMEs are critical to the emergence of new scientific sectors 
and more creative ‘home-grown’ technologies.105 But this view does not go 
unchallenged. Sungchul Chung, president of the Science and Technology Policy 
Institute, which evaluates S&T policies for government, agrees the impact of 
government is declining but he questions whether this extends to biotech. 
 ‘Biotech companies haven’t been able to create new industries yet, not in Korea 
or anywhere in the world. Research still relies on government not private funds.’ 
Nature Biotechnology reported in March 2006 that only 200 of the 600 biotech 
companies created in the 1999–2001 boom are still active, due to a lag in venture 
funding. But that could be good for competition in the long run. ‘That even 200 
companies exist is testament to the bold financial commitment of the South Korean 
government to the life sciences.’106
Environmental services
Environmental technology is another booming field. For example, Total E&S, an 
environmental services company, is a Korean company considering setting up in 
London, with the help of UK Trade and Investment (UKTI) and Think London. The 
company started 20 years ago turning landfill gas into electricity and selling it to 
POSCO and Samsung. The company’s president, Hyo-Soon Song, started the 
company with money his wife lent him. Now he employs 100 people, almost all 
engineers and chemical engineers:
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The environmental business has completely changed from 20 years ago. In the 
past, it was about making a product. Now, we have to make a product but we must 
also invest in the future, in preparation for emissions trading.
Between 2004 and 2010, the annual growth rate in Korea’s environmental 
technologies sector is expected to be 14.2 per cent, with the total market exceeding 
$36 billion by 2010. Several government research institutes, such as the Korea 
Institute of Energy Research, are supporting clean technologies.
The ubiquitous entrepreneurs
Jimmy Kim was happy to meet us in a Seoul hotel even on a national holiday. 
Kim is a serial entrepreneur, indebted to the tight network of students and alumni 
of KAIST, where he went to university after growing up in the US. KAIST bred a 
lot of Korea’s most promising ICT start-ups in the 1990s.
Nexon, the most successful of the KAIST spin-offs, grew from 20 employees to 
1000 in just a few years. NCSoft, creator of Lineage, which develops MMORPGs, 
has a Brighton office with more than 100 employees. Both companies are actively 
engaged in joint ventures or overseas subsidiaries in China, Japan, the US and the 
UK. The Korean games market is growing at 10 per cent a year.107 NHN, the internet 
company that operates Naver.com, the search engine of choice in South Korea, has 
kept Google’s market share to a mere 2 per cent,108 partly by pioneering specialised 
searches linked to games. A day after Kim Jong Il’s nuclear test in October 2006, 
Google announced it was investing US$10 million in an R&D centre in Korea, a 
recognition that even the world’s coolest internet company had something to learn.
Jimmy Kim’s software business Innotive is based in Mok-Dong, an area of Seoul 
known for digital and broadcasting businesses. The building houses floor after floor 
of software start-ups. In the open-plan office, about 20 designers and programmers 
are hard at work.
Innotive is developing what Kim describes as the next generation of presentation 
software, based on technology spun out of the Korean military. He believes it will 
blow away Microsoft PowerPoint, and is looking to the US for investment from 
venture capitalists. Innotive is legally a US company: all the R&D is done in Korea 
but the IP is held in the US. Kim is well connected. His father is president of 
a Korean university. His KAIST classmates are fellow entrepreneurs. Yet he’s 
exploring a software niche that the more risk-averse chaebol have ignored. People 
like Jimmy Kim may yet lead a new wave of Korean entrepreneurship based on 
ubiquitous communications and innovation.
But small, high-growth businesses still face significant difficulties. Being an 
entrepreneur is a high-risk activity; a solid job with a well-known company is far 
safer. Though venture firms have increased from 2000 in 1998 to just under 9000 at 
the end of 2004,109 business networks are still mainly built through family, university 
and business associations. It is difficult to escape the reach of the chaebol if you 
need access to markets or technology. Without such connections, young companies 
have a difficult time staying afloat.
It is difficult to gauge how far the culture and management of innovation is 
changing. As Chiasung Lim of Konkuk University observes: ‘The Korean innovation 
system can be summarized in six words: “strong large firms, weak small firms”.’110 
Korea’s rhetoric and ambitions have changed but old habits linger.
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6 Culture
The shy comedian
 ‘A Japanese journalist recently wrote an 
article about hallryu. Why is the rest of Asia 
looking at Korea? Because it’s different from 
the others – it democratised in the 1980s 
and there is a lot of variety now. Not just in 
culture, but in thinking.’
Chong-Su Kim, secretary general of the Council for the Korean Pact 
on Anti-Corruption and Transparency 
Jong Bhak, director of the Korean Bioinformation Center, is a member of Korea’s 
pivotal ‘generation 386’, named after the Intel 386 processor. He is in his late 30s, 
went to university in the 1980s, and was born in the 1960s. Bhak grew up in Pusan, 
and watched his town change dramatically every year as trees gave way to roads, 
and imported cars to Korean-made cars. The biggest ship ever made was built in 
Pusan, but Bhak’s generation grew up aspiring to be programmers not shipbuilders: 
as a child he played video games and started programming computers. Seeing 
such dramatic change around you makes you wonder what is possible, he says. 
The experiences he had as a child are now being had by ten-year-olds across 
China. Bhak is one of many who believes Korea’s future will be tied to that of China, 
and a shared Asian model of innovation that the West will eventually have to follow:
Korea doesn’t have to work with big pharma in the US or Europe; it can go straight 
to China where the view of health is totally different. We’ll have our own system. 
The West will follow China as well and there will be huge effects.
If a distinctively Asian model of innovation emerges in the next decade then Korea 
should – in theory – be at its cutting edge. However, Korea’s experience shows 
that a distinctive approach to innovation will develop only through competition and 
conflict, as new ways of thinking and working challenge the old order. The Korean 
political establishment is committed to innovation as a source of the country’s 
economic growth in future. Yet the culture of hard work, deference and consensus 
that enabled Korea to prosper in the 1960s and 1970s may be, in part at least, 
an obstacle to innovation in the decades to come. Those seeking to change and 
so challenge Korean culture and habits – like Robert Laughlin – may find 
themselves at odds with much of society.
The Korean spirit
The list of sociocultural factors often cited as crucial to Korea’s economic success 
paints a fairly grim picture of life there. Frequent invasions gave Koreans a tenacity 
and a ‘beat Japan’ spirit that remains long after the deprivations of Japanese rule 
and the Korean War. The ‘han’ (resentment or grudge) psyche is said to arise from 
constant feelings of repression in a Confucian society where the individual must 
defer to father figures or the state. Children are conditioned mentally through long 
hours of rote learning in the classroom and rigorous testing. People work extremely 
long hours: in 2002, the average Korean worked 2477 hours, compared with 1821 
in the US.111 The five-day working week became standard only in 2004. Dr Hwang 
became a national hero partly because he was said to work in his lab until the early 
hours of the morning. Everyone talks of a ‘pali-pali’ culture which encourages 
people to show they are hurrying to complete tasks. It is commonplace to see 
people jogging to show they are getting into work as fast as possible. The impact 
on everyday life was conveyed by a 2006 show at one of Korea’s leading modern 
art galleries: a collection of sculpted heads covered in watches. Time is precious; 
everything must be done fast; every action measured.
That culture propelled rapid industrialisation, in which the task was to produce 
more, faster, to higher levels of quality. It may be less conducive to aspects of 
innovation when the task is to explore, question and create. The biggest challenge 
facing proponents of innovation in Korea is not to provide the hardware of innovation 
but the cultural software. Many would-be reformers and modernisers in business, 
universities and government, often people who have spent time working abroad, 
find themselves caught in the middle of this cultural civil war.
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In a cultural no-mans land
Chris Ko at SAIT described it this way: ‘Culturally, Koreans are introverted and 
fear outsiders, but we are forced to be extroverts to make a living. We’re like shy 
comedians who have to get up and perform.’ Scientists like Dr Jong Sung Koh, 
vice president of Drug Discovery at LG Life Sciences, who worked for seven years 
in California, says he deliberately attempts to mix up the otherwise hierarchical and 
departmentalised culture in his lab.
  Others have found the task of adapting to Korean expectations 
more troubling. We met Dr Hyang-Sook Yoo when she was 
directing one of MOST’s ‘21st Century Frontier R&D Programs’, 
looking for genes that are active in stomach and liver cancers 
common in Asia. She told us her first allegiance was to the 
scientific process, sparked by reading the Worm Breeder’s 
Gazette in the 1950s, the journal that helped found the world’s 
community of molecular biologists. She tried to spend 40 per cent 
of her time on basic science, unrelated to potential commercial 
spin-offs. Yoo was no superstar in the mould of Dr Hwang: she 
coordinated the efforts of 25 principal investigators, each with 
about 20 researchers. Half way through her grant programme, 
however, she was under intense pressure to show progress, 
measured in patents, published papers and potential commercial 
applications. In May 2006, after an unsatisfactory evaluation from 
MOST, she was removed from the project, though she remains at 
the Korea Research Institute for Biotechnology and Bioscience 
(KRIBB), heading up a collaboration with the Fred Hutchinson 
Center in the US. Dr Yoo’s 11 years as a researcher in the US 
taught her that good science takes patience, it cannot be rushed. 
Her Korean funders come from a system that expects measurable 
results, fast.
Indeed part of the challenge pro-innovation reformers face is that the very 
understanding of what innovation means is highly culturally specific. Globalisation 
and democracy will have a powerful influence on the kind of innovation culture that 
develops in Korea, but both have very specific connotations in Korea.
Open Korea?
The government talks of Korea opening up to global collaboration, but the 
traditional word for globalisation, segehwa, refers to ‘reaching another export 
target, being the best, the biggest and the first in a particular industry or field’.112
The defensive reaction to a foreigner like Robert Laughlin is not confined to the 
university sphere. Laughlin found the culture ‘nationalistic and ethnocentric’. Rules 
are rarely written down, he says, so it is often difficult to work out why decisions are 
taken, especially in a culture of deference towards elders. This lack of transparency, 
Laughlin concluded, meant that ‘by western standards, Korea is a lawless country. 
Rules are often not written down on purpose.’
More optimistic commentators see some signs that Korean culture could adapt 
to the demands of internationalisation. Tariq Hussein, author of The Diamond’s 
Dilemma,113 argues that the raw diamond of Korea’s potential needs to be cut to 
polished form. He says of Korea’s World Cup team coaches: ‘Guus Hiddink (and 
to a lesser extend Dick Advocaat) were so successful because they balanced the 
Korean team’s collective energy with individual talent.’114 More young Koreans are 
going abroad to study and the hallryu wave of Korean popular culture may well stir 
more international interest in the country. Hussein says Korea is ‘dynamic at the 
edges but not at the centre’.
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a living. We’re like shy 
comedians who have 
to get up and perform. 
Chris Ko
Chong-Su Kim, secretary general of the Council for the Korean Pact on Anti-
Corruption and Transparency (K-PACT), a coalition of government, business and 
non-government organisations (NGOs) fighting corruption, cites another reason 
why Korea might be different from other Asian tigers:
A Japanese journalist recently wrote an article about hallryu. Why is the rest of Asia 
looking at Korea? Because it’s different from the others – it democratised in the 
1980s and there is a lot of variety now. Not just in culture, but in thinking.
Everyday democracy in Korea
 ‘Koreans came out of a populist movement against a dictator quite recently. You find 
that people are deeply confused by what democracy is,’ a battle-weary Robert 
Laughlin told us, shortly before leaving for the US. Democracy came to Korea only 
after years of techno-nationalist development led by the dictator Park Chung Hee, 
whose goal was to strengthen a country weakened by war, repeated invasion and 
occupation. Military rule ended on 29 June 1987 when then general Roh Tae Woo 
gave in to demands for presidential elections and fewer restrictions on human 
rights. In 1997, Roh Tae Woo, along with another former dictator, was imprisoned, 
a move seen as consolidating democracy.
  Yet the nature of Korean democracy and its role in promoting a 
more open, innovative culture is deeply disputed. Doh C Shin 
argues that Korean democracy is an evolutionary, communal 
project to reduce poverty and alleviate suffering. Shin suggests 
that ‘liberalism and pluralism were grafted onto authoritarian 
Confucianism and parochial regionalism’115 leaving a system of 
highly ordered capitalism. The political system’s ultimate goal is to 
promote well-being, rather than ensure democratic rights.
  Shin’s study shows that Koreans tend to value democracy for 
the kind of economic outcomes it delivers. In Britain, polls suggest 
that 54 per cent of people regard values such as justice and 
political freedom as the ‘most important’ features of society, while 
just 33 per cent favour economic prosperity and security. In Korea, 
the percentages are almost reversed, with 64 per cent favouring 
economic prosperity and 36 per cent political freedom.116 Shin 
concludes that most Koreans want a highly managed democracy, 
based on competent leadership by a minority, rather than a 
culture of mass political participation. Shin’s argument points 
to the dilemmas Korean leaders will face in the future. Innovation 
will require a more open, questioning culture, but that may be at 
odds with most people’s desire for orderly, predictable growth.
The emergence, or not, of a more open and transparent democratic culture will 
have a direct bearing on the funding and governance of science. The Hwang 
scandal exposed the lack of transparency in science funding: laws were changed 
to give Hwang extraordinary financial backing. Only now is the government 
considering reforms, for example, to strengthen the role of review boards of 
research ethics. As Chong-su Kim, secretary general for K-PACT, remarked:
 ‘The culture has medieval roots. Doctor = father, patient = son. Review boards 
were weak or not functioning before Hwang.’
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New movements
The most important democratic developments, however, may well come from 
outside government in the growth of NGOs and pressure groups. Contrary to the 
image of Korea as a passively deferential society, protest is common. A recent 
study found that one in five Koreans had participated in a protest. Out of that 
tradition of protest against dictatorship, new social movements are emerging that 
could have a direct bearing on science and innovation.
In March 2006, Won Soon Park, a leading light of student protests against the 
dictatorship in the 1970s, launched the Hope Institute, a social innovation think 
tank. We met Dr Park and his young researchers in Insa-dong, the artistic area 
of Seoul where the trendy and traditional meet.
After years as a human rights lawyer Dr Park became secretary general of the 
People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) in 1995, an NGO that 
continues to push for accountability and transparency in government and business. 
In 2002, he founded The Beautiful Foundation and The Beautiful Store, inspired by 
Oxfam, which today has more than 60 stores in Korea. PSPD also helped provide a 
home for Hwan-suk Kim and his Center for Democracy in Science and Technology 
(CDST), which was formed in 1997 to promote citizen participation in science 
policy-making. Though small, CDST played a prominent role as a critic of Hwang.
The ubiquitous innovation generation
Ubiquitous broadband was seen as a strategic state investment to prevent Korea 
falling behind in the innovation race:
The early movement toward e-Korea was attributable to the government’s resolve 
that the country would not make the same mistake with the ICT revolution as it had 
made in the Industrial Revolution in the late 1800s.117
Yet this drive for ubiquitous broadband has generated unintended social, cultural 
and political consequences. It is helping to create a more open, collaborative and 
questioning culture that is starting to reach deep into the heart of political power.
After Roh Moo-hyun’s failed bid for the presidency in 2000 his supporters set up an 
internet-based fan club, ‘Nosamo’, to support a second attempt. In 2003, Roh won 
but was soon impeached because Nosamo was said to have broken campaign 
laws. On 11 March 2004 an avid supporter of Mr Roh set himself ablaze in front of 
the National Assembly to protest against the impeachment.118 The impeachment 
was not confirmed and Roh remains in office. Nosamo is just one example of the 
power of mass participation in the world’s most wired society.
OhMyNews International also had a big influence on the election, with its extensive 
reporting.119 It has just 55 employees, who are supported by more than 38,000
 ‘citizen reporters’ – ordinary Koreans who submit articles and opinions on any 
aspect of current affairs. The success of OhMyNews has forced traditional news 
providers to rethink how they work.120 While Korea’s government wrestles with a 
strategy to transform the media sector, an entrepreneur has done it for them.121
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Almost a third of the Korean population uses Cyworld, the Korean online networking 
site, which boasts about 15 million users who generate 90,000 hits per day. 
Perhaps 80–90 per cent of Koreans in their 20s have a ‘minihompy’ (mini homepage), 
an online space for photo sharing, journalling and networking. It’s free to sign up, 
but there is a cost to decorating a minihompy using ‘dotori’ or acorns, a micro-
payment system developed by mobile services provider SK. It seems students must 
have a minihompy if they want to participate in university social networks. Some of 
the more addictive services include a tool to see who has visited your minihompy, 
gift boxes and wish lists for friends, and the ability to update your site from a 
mobile phone.
In Korea, computer gamers have the status of rock and sports stars. Instead of 
going to a film, it is common for young Korean couples to sit side by side in PC 
bangs playing MMORPGs. SK Telecom has a pro StarCraft team, with a former 
sports psychologist as their coach. StarCraft’s top gamers are celebrities.
There are few signs as yet of this collaborative and participative internet 
encroaching on the hierarchical world of big business. The World Bank noted 
in 2003 that although the majority of Koreans were online, they were not using 
the internet to organise information within businesses as would be expected.122 
However, over time, new business models, services and applications are likely to 
emerge from Koreans’ immersion in social networking and gaming culture. Korea’s 
government may have invested in broadband pipes as the latest stage of industrial 
development but it is spawning a connected culture, with its own capacity for 
innovation that the state will struggle to control.
That is not to say the state will not be a player in Korea’s digital future. Korea’s 
current position in ICT is the product of a string of long-term plans enacted since 
the 1980s.123 Digital Media City, a project initiated by the Seoul Municipal 
Government, aims to bridge Korea and the world. As the Korean Culture and 
Content Agency boasts: ‘The knowledge-driven service industry is also emerging 
as the principal axis of the next generation world economy, with the culture content 
industry at its core.’124
It would be unwise to discount Korea’s capacity for far-reaching and disruptive 
innovation based around the internet. Hawoong Jeong, a postdoctoral researcher 
educated at Seoul National University, joined Albert-Laszlo Barbarasi’s physics 
research group at University of Notre Dame in 1998, and developed a software
 ‘robot’ to map the self-organisation of the World Wide Web.125 Jeong’s insights 
now help to support tools of everyday life, such as Google’s search engine. It is 
not impossible that innovations of similar magnitude might emerge from Koreans 
working in Korea. The country could yet become a world leader in the next 
generation of internet services.
Korea, the shy comedian, is at odds with itself. The traditional hierarchical and 
deferential culture of hard work and discipline is at odds with the kind of society 
Korea will need to become to support innovation: more open, cosmopolitan and 
tolerant of diversity. Innovation thrives on debate and challenge; in Korea debates 
are often held behind closed doors.
Yet all over Korea there are signs of change, from international footballers to new 
social movements for open science. Information and connectivity will be powerful 
tools for a more participative, open and collaborative culture, in turn feeding 
ubiquitous innovation. Many individuals and institutions will find themselves painfully 
caught in the middle of these tensions. For every step forward there seems to be 
at least a half step back.
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7 Collaboration
New partnerships for new science
Collaboration is becoming Korea’s new 
conventional wisdom. ‘Everyone now 
believes that Korea needs to be innovative,’ 
says Chaisung Lim, a science and technology 
studies professor at Konkuk University. 
 ‘The desirable model is now joint R&D. 
Before 1997, everyone said “the Korean 
way is beautiful”. After 1997, the Korea 
Development Institute said “collaboration 
is beautiful”.’
London’s Bermondsey antiques market is an unlikely place to find a little piece of 
Korea. Yet Korean companies are among the clients of a small design firm called 
Tangerine, which has 20 staff in London and four in Seoul, working on everything 
from mobile phones to airline seating. Martin Darbyshire and his Korean business 
partner have been working with Samsung, LG and a number of smaller Korean 
businesses for more than 15 years. Often they work for business units on products 
at late stages of development. Occasionally they do more aspirational work 
with corporate design centres. Darbyshire is in no doubt: ‘Our future in design 
is working in Asia.’
Over the last 15 years, Darbyshire has learned a few things about collaboration 
in Korea: ‘If you want to work in Korea, you can pretty much ignore the contract.’ 
Time spent on getting a contract right is unproductive, but the lack of a formal 
contract does not mean the collaboration is open and easy, far from it: ‘We aren’t 
empowered the way we would be with a European partner. It’s cultural – Korean 
people don’t like to give too much away.’
Aside from the cost of wining and dining (the tradition of imbibing shoju with business 
associates still holds) there are other things to get used to. Korean companies 
tend to be stronger in the development of existing products, rather than building 
the foundations for future capability, although Martin admits it is hard to make 
judgements because Korean companies guard their IP so jealously. Little has 
changed in 15 years of collaborative working:
Designers used to have little influence on technology. They’d be told ‘here is a 
circuit board – wrap it’. Now more attention is paid earlier on to human factors. 
The Korean strategy up to this point has been to throw as much mud against the 
wall as possible and see what sticks. I remember LG once showing a client 100 
handsets in the hopes that they would like a few.
Darbyshire believes more Korean companies will eventually open up to collaboration. 
Competition to sell telephones and televisions is becoming more intense, with the 
rise of low-cost competition from China. LG, for example, is starting to talk to 
customers during the development process. Martin’s business partner Don Tae-Lee, 
who was educated in the UK, has become a senior adviser to Samsung E&C 
(Engineering and Construction).
Tangerine’s experience of collaboration in design and innovation with Korean 
companies provides some telling lessons.
Collaboration with Korea is a long-term investment. Not all Korean companies and 
institutions have the same appetite and capacity for collaboration. For example, 
Samsung Electronics seems far more open even than other Samsung subsidiaries. 
Though many Korean companies are extremely cautious, not to say conservative, in 
their approaches to collaboration, it will become inescapable for more of them, partly 
for demographic reasons. A decline in the school-age population means the number 
of first-year students entering university in 2021 will be 34 per cent down on 2003.
The new conventional wisdom
Collaboration is becoming Korea’s new conventional wisdom. ‘Everyone now 
believes that Korea needs to be innovative,’ says Chaisung Lim, a science and 
technology studies professor at Konkuk University. ‘The desirable model is now 
joint R&D. Before 1997, everyone said “the Korean way is beautiful”. After 1997, 
the Korea Development Institute said “collaboration is beautiful”.’
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Professor Han, dean of international affairs at POSTECH, argues collaboration 
starts at university:
These days the world becomes smaller and smaller… Students need to learn to 
be leaders and stay competitive with their counterparts in universities overseas. 
The students are known as ‘local boy’ if they stay here.
  Equal partnerships lead to successful collaborations. As Korean 
science improves it is becoming increasingly possible to create 
win–win relationships. That is helped by cultural and generational 
change. Chris Ko at SAIT argues that: ‘Collaboration works best 
on an equal footing with younger people who have a different 
mindset. They are arrogant but in a positive way.’
  Korean science is integrated into the global community. Publishing 
in foreign S&T journals is always considered better than getting 
into Korean journals. ‘We don’t really count the Korean journals 
because you need exposure worldwide,’ says Professor Han. 
Joint international publishing accounts for just under 30 per cent 
of Korean publishing.
Korean policy-makers are trying to back collaboration with funds and programmes. 
About 10 per cent of the ‘21st Century Frontier R&D Program’ budget will be spent 
on international collaboration.
Publicly funded collaboration
Most public funding for science collaboration goes through the Korea Science and 
Engineering Foundation (KOSEF). Its budget for international collaboration in 2006 
was $1.3 billion, about half coming from MOST and half from its own budget. 
KOSEF’s international programmes began with a Memorandum of Understanding 
with the US in 1977, quickly followed by an agreement with Japan. Agreements with 
the Royal Society in 1984, the British Council in 1992 and UK research councils in 
1994 are just a few of the memoranda of understanding that KOSEF now has in 
place with 58 organisations in 37 countries.126
KOSEF-funded collaboration falls broadly into three main areas: infrastructure 
development including exchanges, symposiums and seminars; joint research, with 
around 100 projects under way; and hosting collaborative research institutes such 
as the Institute Pasteur. About 13 per cent of KOSEF’s international programme 
budget goes to individuals to pursue personal and professional links. KOSEF 
officials acknowledge that it is not always easy to justify collaboration based on 
clear, commercialisable outputs. Reforms are likely to shift the system towards 
more group-based joint ventures rather than individual exchanges. The Global 
Research Lab programme started by KOSEF at the beginning of 2006 supports 
joint projects up to $5 million ($500,000 per year) for three to nine years.
Public–private collaboration
Recent Korean technological advances have relied on cooperation and 
collaboration to a surprising degree, given the country’s reputation for inward-
looking protectionism. When Korea decided in 1989 to designate CDMA as a 
national R&D project, it was going against the dominant standards in the US and 
Europe. A government-led consortium of private firms and the Electronics and 
Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) chose to develop the core 
technology through an alliance with the US company Qualcomm. CDMA, now the 
global standard behind 3G, was rolled out first in Korea in 1996, and since then 
Korean telecoms companies have continued to drive up mobile phone penetration 
 ‘‘ ’’Collaboration is beautiful.Korea Development Institute 
encouraging joint R&D
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rates with the offering of 3G CDMA services, CDMA wireless data services and 
wireless mobile internet services. Some analysts argue that CDMA is an example 
of home-grown Korean innovation but Lee and Lim show that international 
collaboration played a critical role.127
  D-RAM development is another example. Lee and Lim 
characterise this as ‘path-skipping catching-up’, where Korean 
innovators managed to skip parts of the development process 
through foreign partnership, design and process strategies. 
Firms were able to buy product designs in the initial stage and 
then, in collaboration with government research institutes, poured 
significant resources into the development. The knowledge base 
of US-educated Koreans was also critical.
In both cases, successful collaboration involved not just transfer of technology but 
the knowledge of how to apply it, which comes from personal exchanges. If Koreans 
were bad collaborators neither of these initiatives would have been a success.
WiBro, a wireless broadband internet service based on the WiMAX standard, is an 
example of a more recent success. Korea splits ownership of IP with Intel. ETRI, 
Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics were involved in ensuring compatibility 
with WiMax. Wonki Min, director of policy coordination at MIC, says:
We don’t need pure Korean technology – it can be international. WiBro was 
a collaborative approach from the outset, and that is what made it a success. 
New standards won’t be accepted by others if it’s all Korean technology.
Portable internet will be available on the subways in Seoul in early 2007 following 
successful tests in 2006.
The KAIST–Texas Instruments model
You need a car to get around the huge KAIST campus in Daejeon, home to many of 
Korea’s most impressive efforts at international collaboration. Professor Hwangsoo 
Lee at KAIST is a mobile communications specialist, who worked on T-DMB, a 
technology that now allows travellers on Seoul’s subway to watch TV on their phones.
But Lee does not work alone. Texas Instruments and his lab have been 
collaborating for 20 years. On 27 March 2006, they launched a joint venture (JV), 
the CEO of which is an American, Bill Krenik, to develop future wireless networks:
 ‘We have several problems in mobile in Korea,’ says Lee, and the JV is designed to 
address them. ‘We have been focused on basic research. We used a foreign-made 
chip in T-DMB, so we’ve decided we need to commercialise some of those critical 
technologies instead of licensing them from others.’
Lee went to KAIST as an undergraduate and was allowed to waive his military 
service obligation so that he could go abroad and do a postdoc at Stanford. In 
1996 he became a visiting professor at Stanford but came back to work for SK 
telecomm as the head R&D centre. In three years, he created 20 spin-off companies, 
many of which now supply SK.
Texas Instruments and KAIST jointly own the IP that emerges from their joint 
research. Lee plans for T-DMB go beyond broadcasting. ‘We’re going to do a game 
phone and a sensor phone, which could calculate CO2 in the air or the alcohol level 
in your blood.’ Looking five years ahead, he believes internet protocols will dominate 
communications: ‘Almost all networks will be IP-based, we call it AOIP (all over IP).’
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The emerging science model
Jo Won Lee, director of The National Program for Tera-level Nanodevices, which is 
one of the ‘21st Century Frontier R&D Programs’, is working with collaborators from 
the US, Russia and Japan but not the UK. The reason seems simple:
Financial support in the UK is hard to get. Funding is available only for 
Commonwealth members. We want to do some collaboration with the UK, and 
even when we know whom we want to work with, they don’t have money. If we 
tell the Korean government we want to collaborate with the UK, they are willing 
to support that. But, in the UK, you have to do a lot of proposals to get approval. 
This is across all areas of science, not just nano.
Yet collaboration with the US is about more than just money. Lee, who was 
educated at Penn State, explained: ‘I know all about the US. Almost 80 per cent 
of Korean PhDs get them from the US. We don’t know very much about the UK. 
That’s why our collaboration is more concentrated in the US.’
Hanjo Lim, a leading photonics researcher, recently sat on the UK Engineering and 
Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) examining panel for nanotechnologies. 
He is in the Electrical & Computer Engineering Department of Ajou University and 
was president of the Korea Nanotechnology Research Society. Yet even he doubts 
the UK’s capacity to engage in collaboration:
The UK programme was very classic and traditional. You need some more 
speed or variation to adjust to the times. The UK didn’t have one centralised 
programme, but gave funds through chemistry and physics, rather than specifically 
nano-related projects.
Biotech researchers tell a similar story: the UK is conspicuous for its absence. 
Take the new Biotech Center at POSTECH as an example. Established in 2000, 
Sung Ho Ryu, the centre’s director, explained: ‘Life sciences are the most important 
area of POSTECH productivity and quality. It’s the most high-impact work in Korea.’ 
The centre is already creating international networks but these seem to be mainly 
with the US. The first researcher sent abroad went to work in a lab at Stanford for 
six months. That led to a collaborative project and now two more Stanford labs 
want to exchange researchers. Ryu also hopes to create an adjunct position for 
Stanford professors.
Even UK success stories in Korea present a mixed picture. Joon Won Park was 
eager to tell of a successful collaboration started in 2002 between Nottingham 
University and the POSTECH BioNanotechnology Center created in 2001:
 ‘About four years ago, Saul Tendler from Nottingham University got some money 
from the UK networking programme to travel to Korea. He visited KAIST, POSTECH 
and some others and he was most interested in the BioNano Center.’
Together, they developed a new method to combine Park’s surface chemistry 
and Tendler’s bio APM tools. In February 2005, they held the first POSTECH–
Nottingham Symposium on Bionanoscience.
The partnership seems to be delivering results: Nottingham and POSTECH will split 
income from IP half and half. The partners have filed a joint patent in the US and 
jointly authored a paper in Nature Biotech. But sustaining collaboration could still 
prove difficult, according to Park:
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First, the money is always a challenge. I usually don’t think about embarking 
on collaboration for under $100,000 per partner. The Nottingham team tried to 
get funding last year in the UK – to get equipment upgrades and send postdocs, 
but that failed.
However Park is also sceptical of top-down collaborations, of the kind that ETRI 
has established with the Cavendish Labs from Cambridge: 
I was disappointed by the top-down approach. At the prime ministerial level they 
agreed to do something and then KOSEF found the best hosting institution. ETRI 
got an order to write a proposal. Then they have to go visit each other to find out 
more. Only professors who don’t have any funding volunteer. This never works 
synergistically. Maybe it would work after ten years, but it wouldn’t necessarily 
be guaranteed to succeed.
POSTECH is determined to ramp up its collaborative activities. Its accelerator 
lab draws researchers from around the world. But Professor Han believes that the 
exchange of people and ideas is still more important than equipment: ‘Maybe we 
can provide support through the international collaboration department at KOSEF 
for example, but each researcher has their own connections and this is the way 
they want to collaborate.’ Even the companies that come in, like GE, are through 
a personal connection. POSTECH President Chan-Mo Park’s term will end next 
year with the completion of an international conference building that will host 
50–80 international conferences each year.
The UK as a partner for Korea
The US is overwhelmingly Korea’s primary scientific and technological partner. 
A third of the six million Koreans living abroad are in the US. These social ties make 
the US a natural place to look for collaboration. A renewed commitment to stem 
cell research in the wake of the Hwang scandal, for example, involves three Korean-
American scientists working in the US. Jong-Deok Kim, who is running international 
programmes at KOSEF, points out that ‘people in their 40s, 50s and 60s got their 
degrees in the US, so that is a common pattern and difficult to change’. The US 
Embassy science team in Seoul is small because the networks are self-supporting. 
Jong-Deok Kim at KOSEF explains: ‘Four hundred postdocs go abroad each year 
through manpower development programmes. Once they’ve gone abroad, linkages 
develop naturally.’ Estimates vary but it is thought that eight out of ten of these 
Korean postdocs go to the US.
  Yet some argue that Korea has become over-dependent on the 
US. There are signs that Korea is searching for new partners in 
innovation. The Ministry of Science and Technology wants to 
promote Korea’s position in EU framework programmes and 
within the OECD. Collaboration with other Asian countries, 
particularly China, is growing slowly. Some are suspicious that 
Chinese partners may take Korean IP without offering anything 
in return. Jo Won Lee, head of the National Program for Tera-level 
Nanodevices, says of his experiences in China: ‘We have to be 
a little careful because they might take our ideas. When some 
Korean government representatives went to China and wanted to 
collaborate, China asked them to open our nanoelectronics labs. 
China is good in nanomaterials and they have huge resources, 
but they didn’t want to open their research to us.’
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The proliferation of free-trade agreements within Asia are giving rise to a
 ‘noodle bowl’ of agreements which could hinder multilateral agreements.128 
Wonki Min, director of policy coordination at MIC, explained:
In Asia if you look at the size, it’s huge, but the countries have very loose ties. 
There is no collaborative mechanism – members of ASEAN are not very strong. 
We need to create standards with China and Japan like ETSI, the standards body 
for Europe. It’s time to work together to bring the different legal systems together.
UK collaborative projects tend to be less high profile that those with the US, 
Germany and France. The Insitut Pasteur, for example, is supported by both the 
French and Korean governments. The Koreans will fund the institute for ten years 
to the tune of US$300 million. Opened in 2004, the Institute is already considered a 
success, with a growing number of patents and papers published, and about half 
its 80-strong research staff drawn from outside Korea.
Yet Britain could strengthen its position. KOSEF has links with the Royal Academy 
of Engineering and a number of the UK research councils. Government research 
institutes have their own links with the UK, such as that between ETRI and the 
Cavendish Laboratory. Private companies also have good links, such as those 
between Samsung and Tesco. One high-profile public–private venture between 
UK-based AMEC and Incheon City will build the new bridge connecting Songdo 
with Incheon airport.
Recognising how fast it is developing, Korea has long been identified by the 
UK government as a priority for collaboration. Since 1996, there has been 
a Joint Korea–UK Commission on Science and Technology, following the S&T 
Co-operation Agreement signed in 1985. The Korean Academy of Science and 
Technology (KAST) signed a bilateral agreement with the Royal Society in 1998. 
Between 2000 and 2004, a UK–Korea high-tech industry forum met five times. 
And in 2003, a ‘Focal Point’ programme was established to bring together individuals 
and universities in each country to lead collaborations in particular areas of science, 
including nano, bio, space and energy.
According to the latest report from the UK’s Global Science and Innovation 
Forum (GSIF), Korea is stronger on development while the UK is stronger on 
research.129 GSIF recommends that the UK uses international collaborative science 
to improve research and innovation, leverage global influence and meet international 
development goals. Korean collaboration could contribute to all three of these goals 
over the long term.
Yet UK collaboration with Korea faces a number of dilemmas. Korean scientists say 
they would like to work with their British counterparts on a wide range of subjects. 
Bottom-up networking activities can build up essential relationships between these 
individual scientists. But often these networks can do little to cement long-term 
institutional ties or to create shared research projects.
Several of our interviewees mentioned cases in which their British counterparts had 
found it difficult to follow through on an initial positive contact, or to win long-term 
funding. Even the Focal Point programme, which extends one-off meetings to three 
years of networking, suffers from lack of funds. And because government research 
institutes still choose the scientist contacts who attend, the programme is not 
open to everyone. ‘The whole approach needs more time and effort,’ complains 
Joon Won Park.
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The major exception to this bottom-up model is a joint venture between Cambridge 
University’s Cavendish Laboratory and KAIST in the field of nanoelectronics, 
spintronics and optoelectronics. This was inaugurated in 2004, the same year ETRI 
signed a memorandum of understanding with Cavendish to start a joint R&D centre 
in Daejeon. Over the past two years, a number of exchanges and joint workshops 
have taken place. Professor Peter Littlewood of Cavendish Laboratory is carefully 
optimistic: ‘Our intentions with Korea are unusual. KAIST–Cavendish was driven 
from the top down, the kind of thing we rarely do. But it’s gone a lot better than 
I thought it would.’ 
Finding the right recipe for collaboration with Korea will not be simple. More 
opportunities are opening up for relatively informal, networked exchanges. But 
these are vulnerable to personnel changes and a shortage of long-term funding. 
Institutional joint ventures orchestrated top-down run the risk of forcing 
collaboration for political rather than scientific ends. Collaborating with Korea takes 
patience and skill. Attitudes in Korea are changing, especially in the most innovative 
organisations and businesses. As the example of Martin Darbyshire at Tangerine 
shows, Britain does have skills – in thinking, design and innovation – that Korea 
needs to complement its ability to develop products rapidly.
The lessons of industrial collaboration are useful, but not necessarily as a 
template for scientific collaboration going forward. A RAND study on US–Korean 
collaboration developed a framework for understanding the range of possible 
interactions, from centralised and organised to distributed and spontaneous 
(see figure 8).130 Government tends towards the clarity of organised projects, 
but scientists are motivated by professional interaction, as we have seen from the 
early success of the POSTECH–Nottingham collaboration. A model that combines 
organised and distributed elements, and that mixes the best of the Korean model 
with the best of the British, could be the key to truly dynamic cooperation.
Figure 8 Motivating factors for R&D links
   Source: Adapted from ET Crawford, T Shinn and S Sorlin (eds), Denationalizing Science: 
The contexts of international scientific practice (Dordrecht, Holland: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1993), cited in C Wagner et al, Phase Transition in Korea–US Science and Technology Relations 
(RAND Science and Technology, 2003).
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Ubiquitous knowledge, ubiquitous innovation
Leaving Seoul it is easy to forget how far Korea has come, and how fast. In the 
1950s, South Korea was on its knees, illiteracy was rife and university education 
was limited to a tiny elite. Dotted around this city which gives off a reddish-yellow 
glow at night are more than 20,000 PC bangs, internet cafés where gamers hang 
out for hours engaged in digital combat. Online gaming has become a $5 billion 
dollar industry, conducted over fibre optic cables running beneath the streets and 
countless wireless data packets coursing through the air.
  Korea, long held up as the Asian tiger success story of state-led 
industrial development, may be about to enter a new age of 
ubiquitous knowledge and innovation. The IT infrastructure laid 
down by a government worried about missing the next big thing is 
fuelling the emergence of a new ultra-connected culture. 
And the desire to make the most of that platform is taking Korean 
innovation in unexpected directions.
Witness the birth of the state-sponsored Open Source Software (OSS) movement 
to reduce reliance on Microsoft. Since the Korean War, development in Korea has 
been closely aligned with the US. Now Korea sees itself as a challenger. And it is 
pushing for tri-country collaboration by establishing a China–Japan–Korea forum 
to promote OSS. In nanotechnology and biotechnology, similar efforts are under 
way to thrust Korean companies into positions of leadership.
Korea can teach us all something about the future of innovation simply because 
it is one of the best-connected, best-educated societies in the world. It is at the 
leading edge of experimenting with ubiquitous, connected, collaborative innovation. 
This will be far more significant in the long run than the successes and failures of 
superstar scientists such as the disgraced Dr Hwang.
In the opening chapter of this report, we described the sometimes conflicting 
faces of Korean science and innovation, as summarised in table 4.
In chapter 2, we used numbers to tell a story of Korea hurtling to the top of 
industrial innovation. In chapter 3, we described attempts to reform an elite 
education system into universal learning for a postindustrial economy. Chapters 4 
and 5 surveyed the places and businesses where change is under way. Chapter 6 
explored science and innovation in the context of Korea’s growth, democratisation 
and cultural upheaval. Finally, chapter 7 highlighted Korea’s commitment to 
collaboration and the challenges and opportunities that this creates for the UK.
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Table 4 Faces of Korean science and innovation
 Industrial  Scientific  
 techno-nationalism techno-nationalism Ubiquitous innovation
Motivation for  State development State recognition/ Quality of life, competitiveness,
innovation  scientific excellence facing global challenges
Main players State and chaebol State and individuals Networks, individuals, 
   small companies
Qualities or  Path-driven, Technologically Unpredictable, fluid,
kinds of  market-driven informed, practical niche-filling or niche-creating
innovation
20,000
The estimated number 
of ‘PC bangs’ or internet 
cafés in and around Seoul.
Korean technological visions may be prone to over-ambition. Yet its capabilities 
should not be discounted. A RAND research team recently identified 56 technology 
applications that might possibly be developed and implemented by 2020. They 
ranked Korea as one of the most likely places to lead their development.131
Of course, there are uncertainties. A lot may depend on whether anything dramatic 
happens in North Korea to precipitate a sudden, disruptive and costly integration. 
That said, South Korea still chooses to look at integration as an opportunity.
Dynamic Korea is both a government rallying cry and a description of the social 
as well as technological innovation that is now under way. Younger generations are 
adapting Korea’s collective orientation to a world that is more open and individualistic. 
Ultimately, the kind of innovation to emerge from Korea will depend on the interplay 
between the strengths and weaknesses described below.
Strengths
— Government support
Excellent infrastructure has been built over the years of Korea’s development, 
and the government has long-term plans to increase science funding. Excellent 
broadband and mobile infrastructure will continue to contribute to innovations in 
communications, lifestyle and health.
— Private sector driving R&D
The private sector now accounts for 75 per cent of R&D. Increasingly, business 
is calling for government to support basic research rather than duplicate their 
initiatives. There are signs of change among the chaebol and new generation of 
smaller companies, which are investing in R&D to develop niche competitiveness.
 — Highly educated population
Koreans have the highest literacy rates in the world, and excellent scientific 
education. The younger generation is also more global, and wants business 
degrees, not just engineering degrees. The most talented will be the most mobile, 
who have ‘nationalities but no nationalism’.132
— International links
Nearly 10 per cent (6.4 million) of all Koreans live abroad and provide good links 
into other innovation systems.133 The key for the future will be to translate these into 
cooperative scientific partnerships. New links must extend beyond the US into 
broader networks and alliances. Korea’s involvement in ITER, the joint international 
project on nuclear fusion, may suggest a new model.
— Democratic institutions
Korea’s democracy is young but has developed rapidly and allows for increasing 
public participation. This, combined with creative use of new technology, supports 
social innovation as the public pushes for transparency and balanced development.
— Crisis into opportunity
Korea’s success story is based on competitiveness and technology leapfrogging, 
pitting firms against one another in a race to succeed. The 1997 economic crisis 
was a chance to reform. Not only does Korea know how to withstand a crisis, 
it has shown it can turn a crisis into an opportunity.
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Weaknesses
— Unattractive destination
Low FDI reflects the difficulties Korea faces in becoming a leading destination for 
international workers or scientists. Korean culture and media is often nationalistic 
and conservative. Five out of six Koreans think their country should be protected 
from foreign influence.
— Weak links between sectors
The interface between government, industry and academia remains weak in 
spite of reform efforts. Business rarely looks to universities or institutes for basic 
research. In 2003, 97 per cent of corporate research funding went to in-house 
R&D, with government research institutes performing only 1 per cent and universities 
2 per cent.134
— Lack of transparency
Despite post-1997 reforms, there is still a conservative core that resists transparency. 
Corruption, collusion between government and big businesses, and poor links 
between R&D actors are still a problem. All have the same root cause: the low levels 
of trust in Korean society.
— Rote learning
Students are trained, but not in how to lead. But there are now efforts to improve 
graduate training and encourage students to travel and learn from international 
scientists who are the best in their fields. Once students and researchers spend 
some time abroad, they tend to think and work differently.
— Weak basic research
Although funding for basic science is growing, the system remains focused on 
applications and outputs. Korea needs to make the transition from a product focus 
to broader capacity in science.
— Over-planning
Science is often treated like a technological catch-up project, rather than a process. 
The government has tended to over-promise on what science can deliver, which 
puts pressure on science and scientists. After Hwang, government should rethink 
and concentrate instead on creating the space for innovation.
On the train leaving Daejeon, we met a Russian scientist working at the Korea 
Research Institute of Standards and Science (KRISS). ‘The best research can be 
done here, better than at home,’ he says. His experience is that there are many 
foreigners in Daejeon, mostly Chinese, Indians and Russians. ‘Kids come and visit 
the institute’, he says, ‘and when I go to the science museum, it feels like someday 
it could be Silicon Valley.’
But even the most cutting-edge centres of innovation in Korea don’t have the feel 
of Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurial culture. Indeed, Korea’s biggest challenge may 
be its own eagerness to push innovation. Many politicians and scientists know that 
what they have observed in Silicon Valley cannot be forced. Yet the Korean state is 
impatient for change, and worried about the competition from China snapping at its 
heels. Korea’s biggest danger is that its own impatience to spur innovation, through 
state-driven direction, may kill it off. Along the way more individuals like Dr Hwang, 
Professor Laughlin and Dr Yoo will get trapped between the demands of the state 
and the ethics of science.
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What does all this mean for the UK? A ubiquitous innovation system is still emerging 
in Korea, with pockets of the kind of mobility and openness that may eventually 
take hold. A new breed of SMEs is growing, especially in the creative industries, 
gaming and software sectors. Envisaged bio, nano and clean technology 
applications will require both basic research and commercialisation partnerships. 
The question for the UK is how it can align itself with these emerging opportunities. 
We propose five priorities.
Unleash mass collaboration
Koreans sometimes ask where are the UK equivalents of the Pasteur or Fraunhofer 
Institutes? But the most successful collaborations are long term and start with a 
personal connection. The next wave of Korea–UK collaboration should be modelled 
less on France and Germany’s joint centres, and more on the rich network of 
Korea–US partnerships.
To capitalise on short-term opportunities where UK and Korean research strengths 
are well aligned, the UK needs to create one point of entry for collaboration. This 
could take the form of a targeted initiative through the research councils, enabling 
UK scientists to match funding where joint opportunities exist. Extended networking 
through the ‘Focal Points’ programme is also set to continue. This may yet bring 
project successes, such as a mooted project between KRIBB and Oxford.
Creative industries in both Korea and the UK are growing faster than other sectors 
of the economy. UKTI or the Design Council could support wider collaboration 
through a grant scheme for small creative businesses, to fund fact-finding trips 
and network-building.
Be a magnet for talent
The overwhelming first choice destination for Koreans looking to study abroad is 
the US. Many Koreans find the UK confusing, or reluctant to back up good ideas 
with funding. Yet among the strengths of the UK system are its many world-class 
individual departments, professors or laboratories. Institutional links could be 
scaled up to allow regular exchanges of talented people, as has worked well in 
the Nottingham–POSTECH collaboration. Korean researchers already based in the 
UK should be provided with more support to collaborate with colleagues in Korea.
UK universities also need to present a more coordinated approach to Korea that 
is about long-term research partnerships as well as prospecting for students. 
Investment in scholarships to the UK should be increased, and top universities in 
particular should step up their efforts to attract Korean postgraduates in order to 
increase the number of future Korean science leaders that have close links with the 
UK. The new scholarship scheme recently announced by the Royal Society is a 
step in the right direction. It should be developed with Korean researchers in mind.
Get our story straight
A number of organisations representing the UK are interested in inward investment, 
including UKTI, Scottish Enterprise and the regional development agencies. Many 
scientists and businesses in Korea think of Europe as an opportunity, but are not 
sure where to look first. The UK is known for its strengths in design and 
pharmaceuticals, but is considered slow-moving, confusing and difficult to navigate. 
As a priority, the UK needs to shed its reputation for ‘talk and no action’. Too many 
UK-led missions and networking events lack a clear sense of purpose. We need 
a more hard-headed and rigorous evaluation of what has and hasn’t worked and 
a greater willingness to back joint projects and smaller-scale experiments.
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How can the UK get better at matching its R&D capabilities to those of Korea? 
When Korea’s new technology roadmap is published, the UK should look carefully 
at where synergies exist and tailor networking to those areas. Though Korea’s 
strength in pharmaceuticals is behind the UK, it could be an equal partner in ICT, 
materials science and other emerging areas.
Build the knowledge banks
Korea may not be a country on the scale of China and India, but the UK still needs 
to understand more about what is going on, particularly in regions outside Seoul. 
The knowledge gained from numerous scoping trips and networking activities is 
not collected centrally, so effort is duplicated, and wheels are endlessly reinvented. 
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office is ideally positioned to gather information 
through its science and innovation network, but these specialists need more time
 ‘pounding the pavements’, creating links with Korean organisations, and less time 
organising scoping visits for UK visitors. Other European countries combine their 
fact-finding trips into larger, less frequent delegations of 50 or 100 people. This can 
generate more interest from prospective collaborators, and is a model that the UK 
should consider adopting.
Building on Korea’s passion for online interaction, UK scientists could also 
showcase themselves and build networks through social software tools, such as a 
new website called ‘Nature Network London’, being created by Nature to showcase 
London as a science city. ‘Think of it as MySpace for scientists,’ says Sara Abdulla, 
director of the initiative.
Lead global science towards global goals
New models for multinational, multidisciplinary collaboration could place the 
UK alongside Korea at the centre of global research networks. Korea has already 
been involved with ITER and open source standard setting with China and Japan. 
The UK should promote joint initiatives in areas of science that are clear 
international priorities (eg clean energy), which would create an opportunity 
for partnerships with Korea that also connect to global goals.
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